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A NATION DIVIDED: EASTERN CHINA, WESTERN CHINA, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF GLOBAL WARMING 
 
Daniel Abebe* 
Jonathan S. Masur** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
By now, a near consensus has emerged that the world as a whole would 
benefit from an agreement to control greenhouse gas emissions.1  If such an 
agreement is to succeed, however, every major industrialized nation must 
participate—including China, now the world’s foremost emitter of carbon 
dioxide.2  Those are the facts, and they have spurred enormous academic 
interest in China’s stance towards a climate agreement, with scholars offering 
a broad array of analyses and proposals.  The most sophisticated of these 
analyses have noted that joining an international agreement to curb carbon 
emissions is most likely not in China’s self-interest:  China’s rapidly growing 
economy has much to lose from emissions limitations, while China stands to 
gain relatively little from an agreement that curbs global warming (because it 
stands to lose relatively little if warming occurs).3  Nonetheless, these studies 
have concluded that it will be possible to persuade China to curb carbon 
emissions through a series of side payments or other economic inducements; 
the world need simply latch onto the correct terms for an agreement.4 
Importantly, all of these studies have treated China as a “black box”: a 
unitary state whose domestic idiosyncrasies are invisible or unimportant on the 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  We thank Tom 
Ginsburg, Tom Miles, and Dali Yang for helpful comments.  James Grant, Prerak Shah, Hanna 
Chung, and Tom Haley provided excellent research assistance, and Seebany Datta-Barua supplied 
superb technical editing. 
1 WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON GLOBAL 
WARMING POLICIES (2008); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007); 
RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND 
KYOTO (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the 
United States (unpublished manuscript 2007), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1089143. 
2 John Vidal and David Adam, China Overtakes U.S. as World’s Biggest CO2 Emitter, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews. 
3 We discuss these proposals at some length in Part IV, infra. 
4 See id. 
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world stage.5  Yet China is hardly the typical state.  Rather, it is characterized 
by three striking internal inconsistencies.  China is a Communist state, run 
entirely by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”), that has nonetheless 
delegated tremendous authority to provincial and local governments.6  The 
CCP was founded upon Marxist-Leninist ideology but now measures its own 
success by its ability to create private-sector economic growth.7  And most 
significantly, China encompasses a highly urbanized, highly industrialized, 
highly prosperous East, and a much more rural, agrarian, and poor West.8  
Among industrialized nations, China is remarkable—and nearly unique—in its 
striking domestic heterogeneity.  To treat it as just another typical international 
actor, as other global warming studies do, is to overlook these critically 
important internal features. 
We endeavor here to pry the lid off of the Chinese black box.  In this 
Article we examine the impact of internal Chinese political and economic 
dynamics on China’s interest in joining—and ability to enforce—an agreement 
on greenhouse gas emissions.  The conclusions we reach do not bode well for 
the prospects of a climate accord in the immediate future.  Due to the 
peculiarities of China’s governmental structure, and to the pressure the CCP 
faces to accelerate economic growth in poorer, agrarian provinces, China is 
even less inclined to enter into an emissions-limiting agreement than prior 
analyses have realized—and surprisingly less capable of enforcing such an 
agreement, even were it to sign one.  Indeed, it is almost a misnomer to speak 
of a single “China.”  We describe the nation as a combination of Two 
Chinas9—prosperous Eastern China, and developing Western China—and the 
                                                 
5 We employ the term here to mean simply a state whose internal behavior is invisible, and 
which thus appears as a single body with one avenue of inputs and outputs.  The term is borrowed 
from neorealist international theory.  Neorealist scholars treat the state as a black box, arguing that 
internal domestic characteristics are not relevant as explanatory variables for state behavior in 
international politics.  See generally, JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER 
POLITICS (2001); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). But see, 
ROBERT O. KEOHANE, NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (1986); Robert Jervis, Realism, 
Neoliberalism, and Cooperation, 24 INT’L SEC. 42 (1999); Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew 
Moravscik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?, 24 INT’L SEC. 5 (1999) (outlining the contradictions of 
neorealism and the analytical difficulties that neorealists have in explaining recent phenomena in 
international politics). 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part I. 
8 See id. 
9 “The Two Chinas” is a phrase typically used to refer to the People’s Republic of China 
and Taiwan.  See, e.g., Ian Taylor, The Two Chinas Compete in Africa—Mainland China; Taiwan, 
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, Oct. 1997, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2242/is_n1581_v271/ai_20378802.  Like any good 
metaphor, it has been adopted for use in a variety of other contexts, in particular to describe the 
growing income disparities within the country.  See, e.g., Barry Peterson, A Tale of Two Chinas, 
CBS NEWS, May 27, 2005, available at 
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central governmental ties that bind them together are weaker than the casual 
observer might assume.10  The presence of these Two Chinas side-by-side 
under a single national heading is likely to create problems for attempts to 
negotiate a meaningful international agreement on carbon emissions, problems 
that are invisible to any view that fails to consider China’s complicated 
internal structure.  The issues are threefold. 
First, since the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that served as 
the basis for the Chinese Communist Party’s authority, the CCP has adopted 
economic growth as a central justification for its one-party rule.  The CCP has 
pegged its political future to a type of “performance legitimacy”11—it governs 
because it can provide faster growth and higher standards of living than any 
alternative form of central authority.  In Eastern China, the CCP’s approach 
has been a nearly unqualified success.  Special coastal economic zones, 
favorable banking policies, and massive decentralization of government have 
combined to spur blistering economic growth.  Western China, however, has 
been left starkly behind: per capita GDP in Western China is less than half of 
what it is in Eastern China.  The result has been rising income inequality, 
social instability, and dramatic divisions between east and west; rural and city; 
and peasant and urban resident, along with the creation of a roaming 
underclass of Western Chinese seeking work in the coastal cities.12  Worse 
still, these social schisms coincide with ethnic and religious fault lines: 
Western China is home to many ethnic minority groups that harbor substantial 
animosity towards CCP rule.  Poorer conditions in the West have created 
discursive space for the emergence of separatist movements.  Brisk economic 
growth in Western China has thus become a political imperative for the CCP, 
and the CCP has prioritized it accordingly.  China is likely to balk at any 
international agreement that might imperil this growth. 
Second, as a result of its growth-driven delegation of power, the CCP 
suffers from a surprising (for such a centralized government) erosion of state 
capacity13: the provinces often ignore the center’s directives, frequently 
without meaningful consequences.   The political structure of the CCP and the 
institutional structure of China’s government are sometimes overlapping or 
redundant and, in many places, lack effective vertical or horizontal 
accountability.  The environmental regulatory agencies are often subordinate 
                                                                                                           
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/26/listening_post/main697988.shtm.  We push the 
metaphor another step further here, employing it to describe two halves of China separated by 
geographic, economic, religious, and ethnic schisms. 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See infra note 19. 
12 See infra Part I. 
13 MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
AUTOCRACY (2006). 
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to the very agencies they are intended to regulate, and province-level CCP 
officials are often evaluated (both locally and in Beijing) by their ability to 
produce high levels of economic growth, not their commitment to 
environmental protection.  Although the CCP has recently tried to recentralize 
power and rationalize the governance structure,14 the center’s capacity to 
enforce environmental regulations on the provinces is much weaker than in a 
typical industrialized state.  Some scholars have gone further, arguing that the 
erosion of state capacity at the center, over time, will lead to China’s 
collapse.15  We do not subscribe to such a view, nor do we think that such 
pessimism is warranted.  Rather, we simply argue that the existing structural 
relationship between the provinces and Beijing often results in a chronic 
inability on the part of the CCP to provide public goods like environmental 
protection, an inability it will not be able to reverse without incurring 
substantial costs. 
Finally, there is reason to believe that the vast majority of economic and 
scientific projections have substantially underestimated China’s future carbon 
emissions by failing to account for the heterogeneity among provinces.  
Eastern China, as we mention above, is already highly industrialized and 
reasonably wealthy; there is every reason to expect that it will begin to move 
towards cleaner technologies and shift economic production away from 
industry and towards services (which are generally less energy- and carbon-
intensive).16  Western China, by contrast, is poorer and more agrarian, and the 
typical development pattern for such an area involves a shift towards greater 
industrialization and higher per-capita energy consumption (and carbon 
production).  Indeed, this is precisely the direction in which Western China is 
moving.17 
A black box view of China as a unitary nation threatens to reduce the 
Two Chinas to a single, fairly wealthy entity that resembles Eastern China and 
conceals the significant pollution that Western China is expected to produce in 
the coming decades.  Every quantitative forecast of Chinese emissions— save 
for two important exceptions—uses only nation-level data, a methodological 
weakness that can wash out distinctions between East and West.  Of the two 
studies that employ sub-national data, one projects higher emissions than any 
of the nation-level studies; the other projects much higher emissions than any 
other study.18  We read this as tentatively suggesting that Chinese carbon 
emissions over the forthcoming several decades may be significantly greater 
                                                 
14 DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND THE 
POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 229-39 (2004). 
15 GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001). 
16 See infra Part III. 
17 See infra Part I. 
18 See infra Part III. 
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than the standard models have anticipated, with correspondingly higher costs 
to China from any agreement to curb carbon emissions.  In light of the 
importance of economic growth to the CCP, the internal structural of Chinese 
governance and the need to develop Western China, the prospects for China 
choosing to join such an agreement in the immediate future seem slim. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I focuses on the general 
importance of economic growth to the CCP , the distribution of growth within 
China, and the social and economic difficulties generated by the CCP’s hyper-
growth policies.  Part II analyzes the CCP’s internal environmental 
enforcement capacity and argues that China will encounter substantial 
problems in implementiing a climate accord, even if it chooses to sign one.  
Part III critiques the assumptions underlying quantitative forecasts of Chinese 
carbon emissions and suggests that future emissions may exceed conventional 
projections by substantial margins.  Part IV canvasses extant potential 
frameworks for an international climate change agreement and argues that they 
are likely to be unsuitable to one or more of the relevant parties.  Our 
conclusion is a pessimistic one: It would be difficult to convince China to join 
an international climate agreement in the near future under the best of 
circumstances.  The Two Chinas, coupled with China’s internal political 
dynamics, present circumstances that are hardly ideal.. 
 
I. THE CHINESE GROWTH IMPERATIVE 
  
Modern China has reinvented itself upon a foundation of kudzu-like 
economic growth.  Where Marxism once served as the unifying national 
ideology, the CCP has substituted wealth generation and prosperity as the 
touchstones of the regime and suggested that the Chinese people judge the 
legitimacy of CCP rule by the increases in their own standards of living.  
Economic growth in China has been spectacular, but it has also been highly 
uneven.  Eastern, coastal provinces have become wealthy, while central and 
western provinces have lagged far behind.  In effect, there is no longer simply 
“China.”  There are now “Two Chinas”—an urban, industrialized, more 
prosperous Eastern China, and a rural, agrarian, poorer Western China.  This 
divergence in economic outcomes—a divergence that in places coincides with 
pre-existing ethnic and religious fault lines—poses a serious threat to social 
stability within China.  In response, the CCP has begun an aptly named 
“Western Development Program” in an attempt to prioritize economic growth, 
encourage national integration and curb nationalist unrest in Western 
provinces.  Addressing the sources of social instability and promoting growth 
in the West have become a political imperatives for the CCP, and are likely to 
make the governing regime reluctant to join a climate agreement  that might 
contribute to greater instability and stunt crucial economic development in 
Western China. 
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A.      Foundations of CCP Rule: Nationalism and Economic Growth 
Since 1949, China has been governed by the autocratic Chinese 
Communist Party, dominated by Chairman Mao’s conception of Marxism and 
designed to bring “socialist glory” to China while preserving CCP rule.  After 
the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s death in 1976, however, the CCP, led by 
Deng Xiaoping, began to move away from the Marxist ideological foundation 
that served as the legitimating discursive force for CCP authority.19  
Concerned with increasing levels of apathy toward communism and questions 
about its efficacy as the governing regime,20 the CCP turned to two new 
sources of authority and legitimacy to galvanize support among the populace 
and strengthen its hold on power.  The first of these was a new Chinese 
nationalism.  The second was an emphasis on continued economic growth—a 
type of “performance legitimacy”21—as a benchmark and measure of the 
regime’s success. 
This section introduces these twin pillars of modern CCP legitimacy.  We 
touch briefly on state-driven nationalism before turning our focus to the 
principal thrust of the CCP’s political efforts: its drive for “performance 
legitimacy” through sustained levels of high economic growth.  China is 
hardly unique in favoring continued economic growth; there are few nations 
on earth that are not attempting to grow their economies and produce wealth 
for their citizens.  In China, however, economic growth is not merely a matter 
of policy.  Growth, particularly in certain geographic regions, is viewed by the 
CCP as a political imperative, integral to the regime’s survival.  As the reader 
can no doubt already anticipate, and as subsequent parts will demonstrate, this 
focus on economic growth significantly impacts the CCP’s incentives to curb 
environmental degradation and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
1. Nationalism 
In 1989, the CCP used Western criticism of the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown as the vehicle to begin an “extensive propaganda campaign of 
education in patriotism, appealing to nationalism in the name of patriotism to 
ensure loyalty in a population that was otherwise subject to many domestic 
                                                 
19 See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM, 
130 (2004). 
20 For many of the reformers the late 1970s and early 1980s, the CCP was facing a 
population tired of ideological campaigns, the famine brought on by the Great Leap Forward, the 
collectivization of agriculture, the focus on heavy industrialization and the overbearing 
bureaucracy of the state.   See id. 
21  This term was first coined by Samuel Huntington.  See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE 
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER, 106 (1996). 
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discontents.”22  For the CCP, state nationalism is a tool to “enhance the 
political legitimacy of the regime and to maintain political stability and 
national unity.”23  To help ensure its rule, the CCP asserts that economic 
development requires political stability and rejects democracy, arguing that it 
threatens China’s social fabric and delays economic growth.  Concerned with 
the possibility of separatism among China’s fifty-six nationalities,24 the CCP 
cleverly defines nationalism as devotion to the communist state.  The CCP has 
“played up a history of painful Chinese weakness in the face of Western 
imperialism, territorial division, unequal treaties, invasion, anti-Chinese 
racism, and social chaos, because the regime has to claim legitimization based 
on its ability to defend China’s territorial integrity and to build a modern 
Chinese nation-state.”25   
Because there is little difference between the state and the CCP, Chinese 
nationalism implies the support of the CCP and its policies.26  Devotion to the 
CCP and defense of China’s interests, in this frame, are identical.  The CCP’s 
use of nationalism as a replacement for Marxism provides a discursive tool 
and legitimating ideology for its rule.  However, the CCP does not rest on 
nationalism for its own sake.  Rather, it ties nationalism—and support for CCP 
authority—to an instrumentalist narrative of performance legitimacy: only 
authoritarian, one-party CCP rule can produce modernization and high levels 
of economic growth. 
2. Economic Growth and Performance Legitimacy 
From the late 1970s until the suppression of student-led democratic 
protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng and the CCP moved slowly 
toward a reform of China’s centralized economic policies and internal 
governance structure.  Deng and some of the reformers began to argue that the 
Chinese people wanted a higher standard of living, technological dynamism 
and economic efficiency, not more ideology and excessive bureaucracy.  To be 
economically successful, they argued, China needed the CCP’s one-party rule 
to ensure stability and regain international prestige.  In the words of one 
scholar, “[i]n the most fundamental sense . . . China’s economic reform 
strategy has been guided by a strategic vision at the top of the political system.  
This vision links China’s security, global influence, and domestic stability to 
                                                 
22 SUISHENG ZHAO, A NATION-STATE BY CONSTRUCTION: DYNAMICS OF MODERN 
CHINESE NATIONALISM, 9 (2004).  We recognize that there are different strands of nationalist 
discourse—for example, ethnic nationalism and liberal nationalism.  The CCP has promoted a 
version of state nationalism that stresses “political-territorial convergence.”  Id. at 20. 
23 Id. at 29. 
24 http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/china/235627.htm 
25 Zhao, supra note 22, at 35. 
26 Id. at 31. 
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the state of its economy.”27  Sustained economic growth is paramount for the 
continuation of the CCP, the maintenance of China’s territorial integrity, and 
the pursuit of China’s national interests in international politics.28 
The CCP’s reform strategy has been marked by incremental opening of 
the domestic economy, beginning with agriculture in the late 1970s and 
continuing through China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 
2001.29  During the 1980s, the CCP devolved a significant amount of authority 
from the central government to the provinces and cities, freeing local actors—
province and city-level officials—to develop policies that encouraged 
economic growth independent of the center..30  After a temporary delay in 
reforms after Tiananmen Square, by the 1990s the CCP had committed to the 
creation of a market system, privatized some state-owned enterprises and 
began to develop a private sector.  At the turn of the century, the CCP began to 
embrace private entrepreneurs and “retreat from economic administration to 
economic regulation as the core economic function of government.”31 
From a national perspective, the CCP’s economic reforms are an 
unqualified success.  Fueled by these reforms, the Chinese economy has 
produced tremendous economic growth and a rapidly improving standard of 
living for many of China’s citizens (in addition to severe consequences for the 
environment).  Between 1978 and 2000, “[o]verall per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) in yuan roughly quadrupled.”32  China has the world’s second 
largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), surpassing Japan, India 
and Germany.33  It has the world’s largest foreign capital reserves.34  It enjoys 
                                                 
27 Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 246. 
28 See, e.g., Evan Osnos, Angry Youth, The New Yorker, July 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/28/080728fa_fact_osnos?currentPage=all (quoting 
one student activist as saying, “Chinese people have begun to think, One part is the good life, 
another part is democracy . . . .  If democracy can really give you the good life, that’s good. But, 
without democracy, if we can still have the good life why should we choose democracy?” and 
noting that “prosperity, computers, and Westernization have not driven China’s young élite toward 
tolerance but, rather, persuaded more than a few of them to postpone idealism as long as life keeps 
improving.”). 
29 Id. at 248. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 249. 
32 Id. at 236. 
33 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html. 
34 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2008), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2188rank.html. 
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a trade surplus of $262 billion with the United States.35  It is a leading 
destination for foreign direct investment (FDI),36 and has become more 
integrated into the world economy through its accession to the World Trade 
Organization.  By almost every economic measure, the CCP’s economic 
polices and drive for modernization have produced tremendous aggregate 
gains for China and its citizens. 
The CCP’s policies have also created a consumer society in the formerly 
Marxist China.  From telephones to televisions, newspapers to the internet, and 
automobiles to overseas travel,37 the CCP has brought access to information, 
goods and technology that were unimaginable during the Maoist era.  The 
CCP’s economic policies have reduced the role of the state in the employment, 
regulation and affairs in daily life, leaving ordinary citizens more free to 
engage in social and economic activities.  In so doing, the CCP has reinforced 
the norm that prioritizing hyper-growth polices and ensuring economic 
development are the party’s overriding responsibilities. 
B.  The Two Chinas 
Although China as a whole has done very well over the past two decades, 
the gains from its exponential economic growth have not been evenly divided.  
A set of early regulatory decisions by the CCP, coupled with pre-existing 
national advantages, have allowed the eastern, coastal regions of the country to 
industrialize quickly and generate substantial wealth while leaving the central 
and western provinces behind.  We thus argue here that “China” is itself 
something of a misnomer.  There are in fact “Two Chinas”: wealthy, urban, 
and industrialized “Eastern China,” and poorer, rural, comparatively agrarian 
“Western China.”  The CCP has taken steps to address the growing 
inequalities between West and East, most prominently through a “Western 
Development Program” meant to inject powerful economic stimuli into the 
lagging western provinces.  However, the CCP’s efforts have not yet borne 
fruit, and it faces the possibility of substantial social and ethnic unrest if it is 
unable to raise standards of living in Western China to the levels currently 
enjoyed in the East. 
1. Growth and Inequality 
Despite (or perhaps because of) China’s remarkable economic success, 
growth has not come evenly or consistently.38  In the early years of economic 
                                                 
35 James Macartney, China’s Trade Surplus Hits Record $262bn, TIMESONLINE (Jan. 11, 
2008), available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article3170428.ece. 
36 Olena Havrylchyk & Sandra Poncet, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Reward or 
Remedy?, 30 WORLD ECON. 1662 (2007). 
37 Pei, supra note 13, at 2. 
38 HUANG YASHENG, SELLING CHINA (2003). 
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reform, the CCP focused its economic efforts on the eastern, coastal provinces 
at the expense of the central and western provinces.  In 1980, China created 
four special economic zones in the eastern provinces of Guangdong and 
Fujian, followed by the opening of fourteen coastal cities to foreign direct 
investment and international trade in 1984.39  As one scholar noted, “[t]hese 
special economic zones and coastal open areas acquired considerable 
autonomy, enjoyed superior tax treatments, and received preferential resource 
allocations.”40  By the late 1980s, China had extended the special policies to 
all coastal regions through its Coastal Area Development Strategy.41  The CCP 
opened the western provinces to foreign direct investment in 1994 and enacted 
a new revenue-sharing agreement designed in part to funnel more money to 
the West, but already the East’s head start was too great: by 1998, government 
spending in the West had fallen to 83% of the national per capita average 
while government spending in the East was 130% of the national per capita 
average.42  Moreover, the least efficient businesses—the state owned 
enterprises—were disproportionately located in the western provinces.43  
This distribution of regulatory benefits has led to highly uneven 
economic growth and generated profound economic and social inequities.44  
The eastern Chinese provinces, which were the original focus of Chinese 
economic liberalization, now account for a highly disproportionate percentage 
of China’s economic growth and foreign direct investment and have benefited 
from infrastructure development, access to foreign technologies, and greater 
economic freedom in the private sector.45  The CCP’s polices have in effect 
created two “Chinas”: an Eastern China with high levels of economic growth 
and rising incomes, and a Western China with lower levels of growth and 
income.  Technically, China consists of twenty-two provinces, five 
autonomous regions, four municipalities and two special administrative 
regions, Hong Kong and Macau.  (We focus here on mainland China and 
exclude Hong Kong and Macau.)  Though we recognize the administrative 
distinctions among the different political divisions, for ease of discussion we 
refer to autonomous regions and municipalities as “provinces” as well.  
                                                 
39 See Dennis Tao Yang, What has caused regional equality in China?, 13 CHINA ECON. 
REV. 331, 333 (2002). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Hongyi Lai, China’s Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and 
Prospects, 28 MODERN CHINA 439 (2002). 
43 Id. at 434. 
44 ELIZABETH J. PERRY & MARK SELDEN, CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE, CONFLICT AND 
RESISTANCE, (2003). 
45 AR KHAN & RISKIN, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN CHINA IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (2001). 
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Therefore, based on both geographic proximity and economic inequalities, we 
define Western China as encompassing a total of 15 provinces46 with a total 
population of 574 million people;47 Eastern China includes the remaining 16 
provinces48 with a population of 709 million people.49 
While not every province in Western China is poor, as a group they lag 
Eastern China severely along several economic dimensions.  Per-capita GDP 
is 9,967 yuan in Western China and nearly double that in Eastern China, at 
19,813 yuan.50  A number of the Eastern provinces have achieved levels of 
wealth that exceed those in Western China by even more startling margins.  
For example, Tianjin has a per-capita GDP of 35,783 yuan, with Beijing at 
45,443 yuan and Shanghai at 51,474 yuan.51  Put another way, although 
Western China’s population is almost 50% of China’s total, Western China 
contributes just 29% of China’s total GDP (approximately 5.7 trillion yuan of 
a total 19.8 trillion yuan).52  These GDP discrepancies are reflected as well in 
the amount of investment by the state in these regions.  The Chinese 
government spends only 54% as much per capita in Western China as it does 
in Eastern China, (approximately 1083 yuan per person in the West versus 
1992 yuan per person in the West).53  China’s ascension to the World Trade 
Organization and the increasing internationalization of its economy have only 
contributed to rising income inequality.54 
Worse still, these economic divisions coincide with combustible ethnic 
and  religious divisions.  Western China contains the bulk of China’s fifty-six 
                                                 
46 These are: Xinjiang, Tibet, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, 
Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, and  Chongqing. 
47 See China Data On-Line, available athttp://www.chinadataonline.org. 
48 These are: Anhui, Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Jilin, Shanxi, Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shangdong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. 
49 See China Data On-Line, supra note 47.  China has a total population of approximately 
1.28 billion.  China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
50 Id.  By way of reference, as of this writing the exchange rate was approximately 7 yuan to 
the American dollar.  See 
http://finance.yahoo.com/currency/convert?from=USD&to=CNY&amt=1&t=5y. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53Id.  This stark divide in state spending indicates that the majority of Chinese governmental 
revenue generation and spending takes place at the local or provincial level, not at the national 
level; if the opposite were true, the central Chinese government would have the capacity to address 
these inequalities through targeted national spending.  We return to this point below. 
54Khan & Riskin, supra note 45.  As of 2007, according to the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, the western provincesremain behind the eastern provinces on many important economic 
measures: per-capita annual income; per-capita urban household income; and urban and rural 
consumption.  China Statistical Yearbook 2007. 
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minority groups including nationalist-driven separatist movements in Tibet 
and among Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang province.55  Not coincidentally, 
Eastern China is much more homogenous and populated by the majority ethnic 
Han Chinese who constitute nearly 90 percent of China’s population.56  (We 
return to this point in greater detail below.)  The CCP has reason to worry that 
without economic growth in the West, some minority groups may rise up to 
challenge its governing authority.  The CCP’s response has been to invest in 
Western China with the intention of reducing income inequality and 
addressing social instability, although its efforts have, thus far, come in fits 
and starts. 
2. The Western Development Program and the Potential for Social 
Unrest 
In the late 1990s, in response to the festering economic inequities we 
described above, the CCP launched a widespread economic initiative to spur 
growth in Western China.  This “Western Development Program” (“WDP”) 
was designed both to spur economic growth in the West (with the intention of 
addressing the increasing disparity between wealthy Eastern and poorer 
Western provinces) and to speed the integration of those provinces’ non-Han 
minority groups into Chinese society.57  The WDP concentrates on twelve 
western provinces58 representing approximately 358 million people, or 30% of 
China’s population.  (In our delineation of Western China we add three 
additional provinces—Hunan, Henan, and Hubei—which are economically 
similar and geographically adjacent to those encompassed by the WDP.)  As 
part of the WDP, the CCP has focused on building infrastructure, promoting 
sustainable growth, and developing human capital.59   WDP spending 
amounted to 130 billion yuan (equivalent to approximately 1.5% of Chinese 
GDP) in 2000 and 2001.60 
                                                 
55   Zhao, supra note 22, at 199–208.  These separatist movements have already proven 
themselves to be potentially very explosive; one week before the start of the Olympics, Uighur 
Muslims were blamed for an attack that killed sixteen Chinese police.  See “Chinese Border 
Assault Kills 16,” BBC NEWS, August 4, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7540138.stm.  
56Id. at 197   
57 See David S. G. Goodman, The Campaign to “Open up the West”: National, Provincial-
Level and Local Perspectives, CHINA QUARTERLY 318, 319 (2004). 
58 See Barry J. Naughton, The Western Development Program, in HOLDING CHINA 
TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG ERA 253, 255-56 
(BARRY J. NAUGHTON & DALI L. YANG eds., 2004) (stating that Xinjiang, Guangxi, Tibetan and 
Ningxia,Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, and Chongqing constituted 
the initial focus of the WDP). 
59 See Lai, supra note 42, at 439, 442. 
60 See Naughton, supra note 58, at 267–68. 
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The success of the WDP is of crucial importance to the CCP, and not 
only for economic reasons.  For the CCP, development in Western China is a 
political imperative as well.  As the CCP clearly understands, the emergence 
of poorer classes may render the governing regime more vulnerable to 
pressure for democratization if it cannot address the underlying causes of 
income inequality.  Moreover, the CCP’s political problem—which is, at some 
level, the problem that any industrialized economy that generates winners and 
losers must confront—is exacerbated due to three phenomena particular to 
China.   
First, the increasingly divergent standards of living between East and 
West have been accompanied by the breakdown of the social safety net 
provided by the Maoist era state-owned enterprises.61  This has left many in 
Western China without proper access to health care, unemployment 
compensation, or housing.62  These problems have been compounded by the 
fact that the CCP expects local governments to provide education, social 
welfare, and health benefits, further worsening the situation for those in the 
poorest provinces.63  The result has been the rise of a “New Left”64 discourse 
about social justice and mistrust of market forces.  In the particularly pungent 
terminology of one scholar, “popular discontent with rising inequality, unfair 
income distribution, and rampant corruption has made parts of Chinese society 
volatile cesspools of potential instability.”65  At the same time, the CCP must 
balance the need to ensure social stability with providing high rates of growth 
for elites.  Regional disparities, economic inequality, social instability, and 
class conflicts raise the possibility of a new “revolutionary struggle” if the 
CCP is “unable to bring income distribution to a point that is satisfactory to the 
lower classes without disillusioning the entrepreneurial class and other well-
to-do social strata and thereby hampering growth in the economy.”66  
                                                 
61See Pei, supra note 13, at 178. (“Because local officials are more likely to get promoted 
for deleivering short-term high growth rates or other forms of tangible results, off budget revenue 
tends to be spent on building local industries and other projects that contribute little to 
improvements in education, health, or the environment.”). 
62 See Naughton, supra note 58, at 259.(“Poverty alleviation is de facto a regional policy, 
because 62 percent of designated poor counties are in the twelve WDP provinces . . . [and] 37 
percent of the rural population lives in designated poor counties, compared with 17 percent in the 
rest of China.”). 
63 See Era Dabla-Norris, Issues in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China, IMF, 4 
(2005). 
64 See generally, JOSEPH FEWSMITH, CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN: THE POLITICS OF 
TRANSITION (2001). 
65 Dali L. Yang, Economic Transformation and its Political Discontents in China: 
Authoritarianism, Unequal Growth and the Dilemmas of Political Development, 9 ANNU. REV. 
POLIT. SCI. 153, (2006). 
66 An Chen, Rising-class politics & its impact on China’s path to democracy, 10 
DEMOCRATIZATION 151, (2003).  
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Second, the East-West economic divide manifests itself as an urban-rural 
schism67 as well: the vast majority of job and wealth creation has occurred in 
urban areas.  This has produced a floating population, estimated at 100 million 
Chinese, that has left the rural areas to pursue economic opportunities (mostly 
in the coastal cities). 68  The population exodus has placed greater stress on the 
CCP to either improve economic conditions in the rural areas and the West 
(via the WDP)69 to slow the flow of migrants or fund the coastal regions’ 
absorption of its new population of unskilled labor.  These forces generate a 
vicious cycle: the CCP's economic policies favoring the eastern provinces 
encourage migration to those provinces, requiring additional investment to 
maintain the high levels of growth and satisfy the elites who are propelling it.   
Finally, as we noted briefly in the previous section, Western China 
contains a number of ethnic separatist movements that might challenge the 
CCP.  The CCP has already struggled in dealing with pro-independence 
activities in Tibet, and it has reason to fear that the fifty-five non-Han minority 
groups represented in (mostly Western) China might push for self-
determination.70  For instance, Uyghur separatists in the Xinjiang province— 
an area rich with mineral resources71—are increasingly aligning themselves 
with Islamic fundamentalist movements.72  It is hard to overstate the 
significance of these types of prospects for unrest for a developing state 
dependent on natural resources for much of its growth: “the western provinces 
contain almost 50% of China’s reserves in 22 of 45 main minerals, 80% of 
China’s potential hydropower and 58% of China’s natural gas reserves.”73 
For the CCP, it is a cruel twist of fate that economic growth appears to 
have simultaneously legitimated its rule in the East and incubated its foremost 
political challenges in the West.  Failure to address these issues may yet 
produce severe social instability, to be followed by calls for greater social 
justice, rule of law and, perhaps, even pressure for democratization. 
                                                 
67 See Dennis Tao Yang, Urban-Biased Policies and Rising Income Inequality in China, 89 
AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999). 
68 See ZHANG LI, STRANGERS IN THE CITY: RECONFIGURATIONS OF SPACE, POWER, AND 
SOCIAL NETWORKS WITHIN CHINA’S FLOATING POPULATION (2001) (arguing that the creation of 
migrant housing and marketplaces among the floating population has resulted in a new spatial and 
social production to challenge state control). 
69 SeeGoodman, supra note 57, at 318, 327.. 
70 “Even though the western region is home to only 23% of the nation’s total population, it 
accounts for 56% of the nation’s ethnic minorities, who constitute a significant share of the 
population in several provinces: 94% in Tibet, 61% in Xinjiang, and 35% in Ningxia and 
Qinghai.”  Lai, supra note 42, at 446; see alsoZhao, supra note 22, at 199-208.  
71 Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 327. 
72 Lai, supra note 42, at 446. 
73 Id. at 445. 
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C.   Political Imperatives and International Agreements  
The short answer to the problems we have raised in the foregoing 
subsections is that the world must simply pay China to join a global climate 
agreement—and that it must pay China enough that it can afford to continue 
subsidizing growth in the West.74  A number of scholars have already (quite 
correctly) suggested a regime of side payments, though without any reference 
to the particular issues generated by China’s East-West divide.75  Our most 
straightforward contribution here might thus be to suggest that the internal 
costs to China of joining an international agreement—and the amount China 
will have to be compensated—are significantly larger than previously 
believed. 
However, we suspect that the importance of Western development to 
China’s political future will make the CCP even more reluctant to join an 
international climate agreement than this cost-benefit calculus alone would 
predict.  There are two reasons for our pessimism, and they relate to the 
availability of information regarding the costs China faces as it endeavors to 
raise standards of living in the West. 
First, it may well be that the CCP is genuinely uncertain76 of the cost of 
rapid Western growth—or, put another way, that it is uncertain how much 
carbon Western China will have to emit over the coming years in order to 
industrialize rapidly and inexpensively.77  For that matter, the CCP may not 
know what level of wealth or development that Western China will demand.  
The target is likely to move, with Eastern China serving as some sort of 
                                                 
74 We address questions regarding the shape of an international agreement at a greater level 
of generality in Part IV, infra. 
75 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1; Stewart & Wiener, supra note 1. 
76 We use “uncertain” here in the colloquial sense, rather than the Knightian sense, see 
generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921), to mean that China can at 
least assign a range of probabilities to these costs.  The problems we describe here become only 
more intractable if true Knightian uncertain exists.  
77 China has argued—rather implausibly, as Cass Sunstein notes, Sunstein, Complex 
Incentives, supra note 1, at 5 n.20—that it cannot sign a climate treaty because it does not yet 
know its own level of emissions.  Daniel Pruzin, China “Will not Accept” Emissions Limits; 
Government Advisor Cites Insufficient Data, Daily Env’t (BNA), July 9, 2007, at A-2.  This is 
hard to believe as it pertains to current emissions; a number of other people appear to have quite a 
good read on current Chinese carbon outputs.  See, e.g., G. Marland et al., Global, Regional, and 
National Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Environmental 
Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy (2007), available 
at http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/meth_reg.htm.  But China’s rather preposterous stance may 
conceal a grain of truth.  It may simply be the case that China does not know how much it will 
“need” to emit in the coming years, and thus cannot accurately gauge its own self-interest in a 
global agreement. 
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benchmark.78  This is an issue about which the CCP is likely to be highly risk 
averse: far better, from its perspective, for the nation to suffer slightly in the 
net than for the CCP to join a climate accord that provides too few economic 
benefits and results in stunted growth in the West.  For CCP officials who 
need not fear being voted out of office, the possibility of social upheaval in the 
West may represent the greatest extant political threat.  The CCP will likely 
demand a substantial premium to bear this risk, a premium beyond what the 
United States is willing to pay.79 
Second, information regarding the costs and benefits of generating 
economic growth in Western China may not be equally available to all sides to 
a climate negotiation.  Even given the uncertainty we describe above, the CCP 
will likely possess much better information regarding the value—both 
economic and political—of ameliorating the standard of living in Western 
China than will the United States or the European Union.  Without this 
information, other nations cannot know whether China’s demands for 
compensation are legitimate or mere posturing, and negotiations are more 
likely to stall as each side engages in hard bargaining and attempts to negotiate 
a more favorable agreement.80  If the costs and benefits of a global climate 
agreement were entirely measurable in fuel costs, negotiations might not be 
simple, but they would at least be straightforward.  The economic and ethnic 
schism between Western China and Eastern China, by injecting local politics 
into the equation, holds the potential to complicate matters. 
 
II. PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND CHINA’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY REGIME 
If an international climate accord is to succeed in curbing warming, 
China must be a participating member.81  China’s willingness to participate is 
                                                 
78 Studies have shown that individuals care more about relative wealth—their wealth in 
comparison to their neighbors or peer group—than they do about their own absolute wealth.  See 
Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV., Spring 2001, at 323, 337-339 (discussing the importance of relative position in self-reported 
happiness levels); Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Is More Always Better?: A Survey on 
Positional Concerns, 37 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373 (1998) (finding that most people prefer 
higher relative income to higher absolute income); Ed Diener and Carol Diener, The Wealth of 
Nations Revisited: Income and Quality of Life, 36 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 275, 284 (1995) (finding 
variations in the relationship between GDP and quality-of-life variables). 
79 See infra Part IV. 
80 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 89-91 (2004); 
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 303-08 (3d 
ed. 2001);John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. Econ. 
Literature 45, 100-01 (1993). 
81 See sources cited in note 1, supra. 
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contingent upon both its aggregate self-interest (as others have noted82) and its 
internal political dynamics (as we argue above83).  Yet the obstacles to Chinese 
involvement in an international emissions reduction regime do not end there.  
China’s ability to participate in such a regime is also crucially contingent upon 
its capacity to enforce such a regime internally. 
For any observer most familiar with the governments of the United States 
or the nations of Western Europe, it is natural to take the national 
government’s ability to dictate terms to states and localities for granted.  The 
United States operates under a federal system of government that involves the 
divestiture of significant governing authority to the states,84 and yet there is no 
reason to doubt the power of the national government to enter into and enforce 
a climate treaty.  The continued operational success of the Environmental 
Protection Agency stands as evidence of this fact.  This is not, however, the 
case for China.  Paradoxically for an autocratic state with a historically 
centralized economy, China suffers from a significant erosion of state capacity 
coupled with substantial province-by-province collective action problems.  
Barring reform and reconstitution of its administrative apparatus, the CCP will 
likely have a tremendous amount of difficulty enforcing emissions curbs or 
collecting carbon taxes in the provinces, particularly the provinces of Western 
China.  Accordingly, a global climate agreement will appear unattractive to a 
China that could well find itself, as a nation, in violation of such an agreement 
in ways that it may not be able to  control. 
A.   The Weaknesses of Central Environmental Regulation 
China’s capacity to implement a climate change agreement depends 
heavily upon the central (national) government’s ability to coerce local and 
provincial officials and private actors into compliance with environmental 
regulations.  Surprisingly, for a communist state, China’s central government 
suffers from several limitations on its authority.  Despite the center’s efforts to 
assert control over regulatory institutions,85 the financial sector, and revenue 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1 (arguing that China will not join any agreement that does 
not further its own national interest). 
83 See supra Part I. 
84 Most Western European nations are even more centralized than the United States.  For 
instance, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have centralized national governments 
without corresponding state structures and vest considerably greater authority with their national 
legislatures and executives.  See Daniel J. Elazar, Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems, 18 
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 237 (1997) (comparing the unitary governments of France and England with 
the federal model of the United States); Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 195, 199-200 (2000) (finding that devolutions of authority in France, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom do not create sub-national polities); cf. Daniel J. Elazar, From Statism to 
Federalism—A Paradigm Shift, 25 PUBLIUS 5 (1995) (describing a trend towards even greater 
centralization through federations such as the European Union). 
85 See Yang, supra note 65, at 146–48 
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collection, central ministries still face significant obstacles in exerting 
authority over provincial officials, hold influence over the center’s taxing and 
spending apparatus.86  The problem is only exacerbated for China’s 
environmental agencies, which often find themselves subordinate to the very 
government bureaus and industries they are meant to regulate.  Worse still, 
these problems exist within the context of rampant corruption, particularly at 
the local level.  In the presence of these myriad weaknesses, the CCP cannot 
be certain of its ability to bend the provinces to its regulatory will. 
1. The Erosion of Central Control 
Like other communist nations, China’s government is run by the 
Communist Party apparatus, with offices of central administration located in 
Beijing. This central administration consists of a variety of overlapping 
legislative and executive bodies: the Party Congress, the Central Committee, 
the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee, and the various national 
ministries.87  Much like American states, China’s various provinces, centrally 
administered cities (such as Beijing and Shanghai), and special autonomous 
regions possess their own, largely autonomous, regional governments.  (For 
ease of explication, we will refer to the provinces, centrally administered 
cities, and autonomous regions as “provinces.”)  Although there are some 
slight variations, each province also contains separate city, county, and 
township village governments. 
Each central government ministry has an office at almost every level of 
government, ranging from central authority in Beijing to remote township 
villages.  For example, the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) is 
based in the central administration (in Beijing) and has an Environmental 
Protection Bureau (EPB) or Environmental Protection Office (EPO) at the 
headquarters of the Fujian provincial government, and within almost every 
city, district, county, and township village within Fujian.88  This basic structure 
applies to China’s 29 ministries in each of China’s 31 provinces and their 
corresponding cities, districts, counties and township villages.  Figure 1 
describes this organizational system in graphical form: 
                                                 
86 See Pei, supra note 13, at 141–44(arguing that the fiscal and administrative 
decentralization that took place during the early reform period “jointly created powerful incentives 
for local authorities to adopt predatory policies and practices,” and recent attempts to recentralize 
the fiscal system have had only moderate effects).  
87 Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 172. 
88 Abigail R. Jahiel, Environmental Protection in China, CHINA QUARTERLY 758-59 (1998) 
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Figure 1: China’s Environmental Regulatory Apparatus89 
 
This structure conveys the appearance of top-down, hierarchical control, 
but the reality is quite to the contrary.  Rather, “all territorial units with the 
rank of province are formally equal in rank to each other and to the central 
government ministries . . . [and] none of these units can issue binding orders to 
any others.”90  Out of necessity, then, the central government relies on 
cooperative, as opposed to coercive, relationships with the provinces to 
achieve its economic and political goals.  Before 1994, local governments 
were entirely responsible for collecting not only their own taxes, but in 
                                                 
89 This figure is taken from id. at 760. 
90 Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 180 (emphasis added). 
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addition the taxes that funded the operation of the central government.91  As 
Chinese economic growth exploded, this tax collection structure created huge 
incentives for corruption at the province, city and township level.  Though the 
post-1994 reforms have restructured the tax collection process—creating 
greater uniformity and transparency in taxation and a slight reapportionment of 
personal and corporate income taxes to the central government92—the 
provinces and localities, as the engines of China’s hyper-growth policies, have 
maintained significant leverage vis-à-vis the central government.93  As of 
1997, provincial and local governments accounted for over 70% of 
government expenditures in China; by comparison, state and local spending in 
the United States represent only 46% of government expenditures.94  Figure 2 
compares China’s level of local expenditures to a variety of other nations’: 
Figure 2: Local Revenues and Local Expenditures for Selected    
 Countries95 
 
Share of Subnational Governments 
(in percent of total) 
Countries Revenues Expenditures 
 1990 1997 1990 1997 
Argentina 38.2 41.1 46.3 43.9 
Australia 20.0 22.7 50.9 47. 9 
China 33.8 48.8 67.4 72.6 
Germany 28.9 28.8 40.2 37.8 
India 33.0 36.1 51.1 53.3 
Indonesia 2.9 2.9 13.1 14.8 
Mexico 19.0 20.6 17.8 26.1 
Russian Federation … 40.6 … 37.6 
South Africa 5.5 5.3 20.7 49.8 
United States 33.8 32.9 42.0 46.4 
 
                                                 
91 Id. at 182. 
92 See Yang, supra note 14, at 80(noting that “local authorities are guaranteed a base 
amount . . . [and] revenue above the base amount is split between central and local governments . . 
. at 50:50 for 2002 and 60 percent for the central government in 2003”). 
93 Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 181. 
94 See Dabla-Norris, supra note 63, at 4–5 
95 This figure is reproduced from id. at 5 (emphasis added to China row). 
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The echoes of this decentralization are visible in the substantial 
disparities in government spending levels in Eastern and Western China.96  
The counterintuitive consequence is that in many respects, China’s central 
government holds only a highly diminished power of the purse over the 
provinces. 
In addition, China’s size makes it extremely difficult to govern centrally.  
Because many of the provinces have populations over 50 million people, the 
central government is forced to delegate substantial responsibility for social 
welfare, economic initiatives, and administrative control to the provincial 
level, allowing greater flexibility in practice from province to province.97  The 
central government might once have been able to impose its will upon the 
periphery through its monopoly on ideology—local officials and private actors 
would have been selected and trained to obey the central government’s 
dictates and learned to fear the repercussions of noncompliance.  But the 
CCP’s emphasis on economic growth above all other priorities has shunted 
aside whatever ideological discipline might have once existed and diminished 
the center’s leverage over private, local, and even provincial activity.98  The 
result has been a dramatic erosion of state capacity: 
Although the Chinese state appears to be institutionally unconstrained, 
centralized, and omnipresent, its ability to implement policy and enforce 
rules is severely limited by its incoherence, internal tensions and 
weaknesses.  The phenomenon . . . is widely reported in the Chinese 
press.  It includes the defiance of the central government law and policies 
by the local authorities, the willful violation of law and regulations by 
government officials, and the practice of local protectionisms that has 
plagued the enforcement of contracts, court judgments, and national 
laws.99 
Indeed, the entire thrust of China’s post-Mao reforms has been to shift 
political, economic and administrative power from the national government to 
the various sub-national authorities, with the goal of “encourag[ing] every 
territorial political body to do its utmost to develop its local economy fast 
                                                 
96 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  Viewed in this light, China’s spending on the 
WDP is somewhat striking.  Western Development is a high priority for the CCP, yet China 
spends less than $20 billion per year on the program.  See note 60, supra, and accompany text.  
For a Chinese central government hampered by a lack of full control over taxation, however, that 
represents a substantial outlay. 
97 Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 181. 
98 Id.  See also Pei, supra note 13, at 147 (arguing that the focus on economic growth and 
decentralization allowed “new administrative powers by the central government but unchecked at 
the local level, regional political power bosses were able to establish fiefdoms and gain 
monopolistic power”). 
99 Pei, supra note 13, at 13(emphasis added). 
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enough to maintain social and political stability.”100  The CCP has used the 
lowest levels of government—mostly the cities—as the engines of its hyper-
growth policies,101 resulting in a substantial transfer of political and economic 
power from the center.  It comes as little surprise to the CCP that the modern 
trend has been towards rapid economic growth at the expense of centralized 
authority; this was precisely the government’s objective.102 
2. Of Foxes and Henhouses: China’s Environmental Apparatus 
Despite China’s predominant focus on economic growth, there is no 
question that the national government has devoted meaningful attention to 
environmental concerns.  Yet even at the national level, there exist a number 
of structural problems that inhibit aggressive efforts to control pollution. 
Though China’s EPBs are tasked with “implement[ing] policies designed 
by SEPA and [assisting] in drafting local regulations,”103 they are “heavily 
dependent” on local governments: local and provincial governments provide a 
significant proportion of funding for regional EPBs. 104  Consequently, 
provincial governments hold tremendous power to cut the cord on the local 
EPBs and inhibit their efforts if they act contrary to local or provincial 
interests.  This lack of centralized enforcement capacity would not pose such a 
severe problem were provincial and local officials themselves committed to 
enforcing environmental regulations.  Yet that is hardly the case.  Local 
governments have little incentive to take any action that might slow economic 
growth, including addressing any sort of environmental concern (whether 
dictated by the central government or not).   In keeping with the CCP’s 
nationwide focus on performance legitimacy, local officials are evaluated 
primarily on their ability to deliver sustained economic growth.  As one 
scholar explains: 
The local EPBs are heavily dependent on both the higher level 
environmental authorities and on local governments. However, as little 
importance is given to environmental criteria in assessing the 
                                                 
100 Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 181. 
101 Id. at 179. 
102 See Y. Qian & G Roland, Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint, 88 AMER. ECON. 
REV.  1143 (1999).  But see, Kellee Tsai, Off Balance: The Unintended Consequences of Fiscal 
Federalism in China, 9 J. OF CHINESE POL.SCI. ___ (2004). 
103 Jahiel, supra note 88, at 759. 
104 Id.(“In all cases, however, it is the local government, not the higher levels of the 
environment protection apparatus, that provides the environmental agencies with their annual 
budgetary funds, approves institutional advancements in rank and determines increases in 
personnel and even the allocation of such resources as cars, office buildings and employee 
housing.”); Arthur P.J. Mol & Neil T Carter, China’s environmental governance in transition, 15 
ENVTL. POL.  149, 155 (2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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performance of local governments, they [the local governments] often 
display no interest in stringent environmental reform, yet they play a key 
role in financing the local EPBs. There are also poor (financial) 
incentives for both governments and private actors to comply with 
environmental laws, standards and policies.105 
Moreover, local officials are not evaluated only by their ostensible 
supervisors in Beijing.  Even though they are not elected, provincial and local 
officials are reliant upon the local interests that they govern and those 
interests’ continued generation of tax revenues.  Provinces and cities are the 
primary suppliers of social welfare benefits, education, and health care106—
recall that 70% of Chinese government spending occurs at the province and 
local levels.  Local industries are the primary generator of economic growth, 
the source of government funding, and the purveyor of employment 
opportunities.  Consequently, provincial officials have little incentive to take 
any regulatory action that would diminish the sources of funds they need to 
provide social services and have little desire to curtail the economic engine 
that drives local—and their own—successes. 
The provincial emphasis on growth also encourages collusion between 
local EPB officials and private enterprises to circumvent regulation.107  For 
instance, local governments have frequently granted tax abatements to private 
firms when fees from environmental violations start to harm production, 
allowing the companies to continue to operate—and pollute—at the same 
level.108  Collusion similarly diminishes the central government’s ability to 
monitor private behavior and environmental compliance in the provinces109: 
the local officials, private entrepreneurs and local residents have little reason 
to produce accurate information on pollution and every incentive to subvert 
policies that might interfere with continued high rates of economic growth.110  
This effect is strongest where it is most pernicious: in Western China, where 
                                                 
105 Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 149, 155. 
106 See Dabla-Norris, supra note 63, at 4. 
107 See Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 155 (noting that local incentives structures result in 
“a significant level of collusion between local officials and private enterprises which employ them 
in order to get around strict environmental monitoring.”). 
108 Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 283. 
109 See generally, Pei, supra note 13, at 147. 
110See  Mol & Carter, supra note104, at 155 (noting that “local EPBs are criticised for their 
poor environmental capacity (in both qualitative and quantitative terms) and, more generally, for 
the lack (and distortion) of environmental information.”).  Local governments have also 
colluded to shift urban waste to poorer rural areas and, unbelievably, some cities have required 
that chemical companies locate downstream so as to not pollute the city’s drinking water—shifting 
the cost of environmental degradation to the next city downstream.  See Jahiel, supra note 88, at 
780. 
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rapid industrialization and economic growth are fueled by the construction of 
new, highly polluting coal plants and cement factories.111 
In addition, even within the central government the environmental 
protection bureaus have historically been embedded in the very ministries that 
demand the greatest environmental regulation and supervision.  For example, 
until recently nearly 75% of the EPBs across China were located within (and 
are subordinate to) the ministries that they were expected to regulate.112  This 
has weakened the little coercive power that the EPBs possessed, particularly in 
a society with an ethos of high economic growth.  Although the State 
Environmental Protection Agency now possesses ministerial status (a 
relatively recent change113), by virtue of China’s hierarchical system it still 
cannot issue binding orders on co-equal national ministries and province level 
governments.114  Thus, “[w]hile the national environmental authority in 
Beijing has strengthened its position vis-a-vis other ministries and agencies, 
this is not always the case at the local level, where more than incidentally the 
EPBs are part of—and thus subservient to—an economic state 
organization.”115 
3. Corruption and Capacity 
The combination of the CCP’s high growth policies and its massive 
divestiture of power to the provinces and townships have created strong 
incentives for corruption.116  China is one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world, with “corruption result[ing] in astronomical losses of state assets 
estimated at around 50 billion yuan per year.”117  Although“[a]uthoritative 
Chinese estimates put corruption-related losses of state revenue at around 4 
percent of GDP annually, and corruption-related capital flight at around 2% of 
GDP,”118 some estimates place the total value of corruption at approximately 
                                                 
111 See supra Part I. 
112 Jahiel, supra note 88, at 765. 
113 As late as 1998, the national and local EPBs lacked “national ministry designation,” the 
Chinese equivalent of an American agency lacking cabinet-level status.  They were subordinate to 
both the other national ministries and the province-level governments.  As a consequence, “many 
other ministries effectively control parts of the environmental agenda, resulting in competing 
priorities and lack of discipline and coordination.  The Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, and urban construction bureaus, for example, all dominate[d] parts of the 
environmental agenda.”  Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 283.  For a more in-depth discussion, see 
Jahiel, supra note88, at 759.  
114 By the late 1990s, approximately 75% of the EPAS were independent, reflecting the 
ministerial status of the SEPA. 
115Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 149, 157; see also Jahiel, supra note 88, at 765. 
116 See SUN YAN, CORRUPTION AND MARKET IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2004). 
117 See Yang, supra note 14, at 219. 
118 Sun, supra note 116, at 258. 
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15 percent of Chinese GDP.119  The recent Chinese earthquake and the 
collapse of several schools in the Sichuan province120 provide tragic evidence 
of the fact that “in infrastructure construction alone, corruption is estimated to 
affect nearly 100 billion yuan worth of projects a year [and has] resulted in 
cost overruns as well as collapsed buildings, bridges, dams and losses in 
lives.”121  The efficacy of the Chinese administrative state, particularly in the 
enforcement and implementation of environmental rules and policies, is 
substantially limited by widespread corruption at every level of governance.   
Though the CCP has taken steps to try to address rampant official 
corruption,122 the regulatory bodies charged with monitoring party officials123 
and rooting out corruption lack the necessary authority and resources to fulfill 
their responsibilities.  The Central Discipline Inspection Commission 
(“CDIC”) reflects the CCP’s hierarchical organizational structure and the head 
of the CDIC—the secretary—is subordinate the CCP’s secretary at both the 
national and provincial levels.124  The inspection teams often consist of 
“retired senior leaders who have little local knowledge and operate in isolation 
[and] [t]heir movements and information sources can be easily controlled by 
the same provincial leaders that they are supposed to evaluate.”125  Given the 
hundreds of thousands of CCP officials operating across China and the four-
to-five month inspection process, few provinces can be monitored in a given 
year—for example, in 2003, ten provinces received inspections by five 
inspection teams.126  The same incentive structure that produces local 
government indifference to environmental regulations produces the high-level 
of corruption that weakens the center’s monitoring capacity and gradually 
leads to the erosion of state capacity.      
B.  Chinese Collective Action Problems  
The predictable result of this combination of weakening central control 
and self-interested provincial governments is a classic environmental 
                                                 
119Lieberthal, supra note 19, at 199.   
120 See generally Jim Yardley, Grief in the Rubble: Chinese Are Left to Ask Why Schools 
Crumbled, New York Times, May 25, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/world/asia/25schools.html (describing the Chinese 
earthquake, the collapse of a number of Chinese primary schools, and the political and economic 
ramifications). 
121 See Yang, supra note 14, at 219. 
122 For a discussion of these steps see generally id. at 224–48. 
123 See generally, Pei, supra note 13, at 148.(noting that in 2002, approximately 2,925 high 
ranking officials were prosecuted for embezzlement or bribery of sums exceeding 50,000 yuan).   
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 149. 
126 Id. 
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collective action problem among the Chinese provinces.127  It may well be in 
the interest of China as a whole—and in the interests of nearly every province 
individually—to impose and enforce meaningful curbs on pollution, 
particularly as part of an international agreement that might involve substantial 
side payments to China.  (More on this later.)  But within China’s current 
regulatory structure, the center lacks the capacity to effectively impose such 
curbs on all provinces simultaneously, and it is in the interest of no single 
province’s officials to act unilaterally and sacrifice its own economic growth 
for the environmental good of the nation.  This is particularly true for 
restrictions on emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, which 
are essentially irrelevant if enacted locally and sporadically and only beneficial 
if undertaken on a truly international scale.128 
At the outset, this collective action problem raises the possibility that, 
even were China to sign onto a global climate agreement, it simply might not 
be capable of enforcing it internally.129  If the global agreement involved 
worldwide taxes on carbon emissions, provincial governments might fail to 
collect those taxes on local industries.  If such an agreement took the form of a 
cap-and-trade regime, local officials might refuse to sanction industries that 
neglected to purchase emissions credits before polluting.  In such a scenario, 
CCP intentions and worldwide protestations to the contrary, Chinese emissions 
would continue to grow despite the legal ramifications for the country as a 
whole. 
The more likely second-order problem is that the CCP might decline to 
join a global climate agreement for fear that it would wind up in violation of 
that treaty due to internal forces beyond its control.  If the scenario described 
in the previous paragraph were to arise, and China were to sign a global 
climate accord and then fail to live up to its responsibilities, the central 
government would likely face steep international fines (or, alternatively, stiff 
tariffs on valuable exports produced by the provinces of Eastern China) for 
what amounts to a crime it did not commit.  The result might very well be to 
                                                 
127 Cf. Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 331, 339-400 (1998) (describing the free rider problem in the field of international 
environmental law); Joshua Glasgow, Not in Anybody’s Backyard?  The Non-Distributive 
Problem with Environmental Justice, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 71 (2005) (arguing that minorities 
and the poor are unable to overcome environmentally-based collective action problems); Richard 
L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale 
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that there is no 
race-to-the-bottom collective action problem in general but describing areas in which federal 
regulation would be helpful in curing specific market failures). 
128 See Suntsein, Complex Climate Change Incentives, supra note1, at 9 (explaining that 
even the Kyoto protocol, because it does not include nations such as China and India, would have 
very little effect on global warming).  Sporadic or localized carbon abatement would produce even 
fewer gains.  
129 For a description of the various forms that these sorts of agreements might assume, see 
infra Part IV. 
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further strengthen the hand of provincial and local governments at the expense 
of China’s central administration, hardly the outcome the CCP would prefer. 
The CCP could, of course, solve these structural problems by radically 
restructuring the party, the central government and the administrative 
apparatus.  It could impose stricter controls on local and provincial officials; 
force them to report more directly to superiors in central administration; hire 
and train an enormous cadre of civil servants and dispatch them to the 
provinces as tax collectors; or take any number of other actions to consolidate 
power in Beijing.  Some scholars argue that the CCP—gradually and with 
mixed results—has undertaken precisely this project.130 
There is little doubt that the CCP could succeed eventually in such an 
endeavor; it is, after all, an autocratic regime, and in the end it would be able 
to exert control over the levers of power.  However, such measures would be 
tremendously costly and would tend to subvert the national divestment of 
governing authority that has helped fuel China’s economic rise (and helped 
preserve the CCP’s authority).  At minimum, China would likely demand 
additional side payments to cover these transition costs, again inflating the cost 
of purchasing Chinese participation in a climate regime beyond what 
straightforward cost-benefit analyses have indicated.131 
Worse still, information about these costs—much like information about 
China’s need to develop the Western provinces—is asymmetric: the United 
States will have significantly more difficulty than the CCP in gauging the costs 
to the CCP of radically reasserting control over the provinces.  (Contrast this 
with estimates of the economic impact of emissions controls on Chinese 
industry, which rely on data equally available to all parties.)  Again, 
asymmetric information about relative bargaining positions can only 
complicate negotiations, even under the best of circumstances.132 
The idea that an autocratic state known for many years for having a 
centrally managed economy could fall prey to diminishing centralized 
authority and self-interested local behavior is counter-intuitive, to say the least.  
Yet that appears to be exactly what has occurred in China, to the detriment of 
its interest in—and ability to—join an international climate agreement. 
 
III. THE TWO CHINAS, AND THE PERILS OF BLACK-BOX FORECASTING 
 In the previous Parts we make essentially three points: first, that 
while Eastern China is already highly industrialized and relatively wealthy, 
Western China remains comparatively agrarian and poor; second, that the 
                                                 
130 SeeYang, supra note 14;  BARRY J. NAUGHTON & DALI L. YANG, HOLDING CHINA 
TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG ERA ( 2004). 
131 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (describing the same problem as it relates 
to incentives for western development).  
132 See supra note 80.  
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Chinese central government is committed to industrializing the largely rural 
West, predominantly out of political necessity; and third, that China will be 
especially reluctant—to a degree not previously appreciated—to enter into any 
carbon emissions control regime that would impinge upon its ability to 
industrialize the West, due in large part to the structural difficulties the central 
government faces in imposing environmental controls or taxes on the 
provinces.  There, we sought to describe the qualitative barriers to an effective 
climate agreement with China. 
In this Part, we seek to make one additional quantitative point that stems 
from the same analysis of China’s western growth.  Scientists have constructed 
a number of mathematical models that attempt to predict Chinese carbon 
emissions for the next thirty years based upon data from prior years.  These 
models again treat China as a unitary nation—a black box—with a single per 
capita GNP, a single level of per capita emissions, and a single demand for 
economic development and improved air quality. 
For the China of the early 21st Century, this is a poor approximation.  As 
the foregoing Parts make clear, China is not one nation but two: an 
industrialized East that has already achieved a fairly high level of economic 
prosperity but suffers from significant environmental degradation, and a rural 
West with significantly lower levels of economic development and pollution.  
In its simplest possible terms, our argument is that these Two Chinas will 
develop very differently from one another (and in the case of the West, very 
differently from the hypothesized unitary China of the climate models) over 
the coming years.  Eastern China will likely move towards cleaner 
technologies and lower per-capita levels of pollution; barring the radical 
restructuring we previously described, Western China will likely move 
towards greater industrialization and higher per-capita levels of pollution.  The 
vast majority of environmental models ignore regional variations within the 
country and assume that the nation, as a whole, will behave substantially like 
Eastern China.133  Consequently, it is likely that they have systematically 
underestimated the amount of greenhouse gas that China will produce over the 
next several decades—or so we will argue.134 
                                                 
133 There are two important exceptions: the International Energy Agency Global Energy 
Outlook (2007), available at http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org, and a climate model by 
Maximillian Auffhammer and Richard T. Carson.  Maximilian Auffhammer & Richard T. Carson, 
Forecasting the Path of China’s CO2 Emissions Using Province Level Information (2007), 
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/are_ucb/971/.  These outliers reach divergent results from 
the standard models and lend important support to our argument, and we discuss them in some 
detail below. 
134 For reasons that will become evident, the conclusions we offer in this Part are 
necessarily tentative.  With this in mind, and for ease of explication, we will refrain from placing 
the word “likely” or “probable” in front of every assertion, though of course that is all these 
conclusions are. 
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Legal scholars and policymakers have relied heavily—and appropriately 
so—upon these standard models of Chinese emissions in constructing and 
evaluating proposed emissions accords.  Analyses of Chinese incentives to 
reach agreement on carbon emissions and of the side payments to China that 
might be required before any agreement is possible depend significantly on 
these predictive models.  And yet the errors in calculation engendered by this 
black-boxing of China are not mere trifles that will require small recalibrations 
in various projections.  Rather, they represent billions of metric tons of carbon 
dioxide and thus potentially hundreds of billions or trillions of dollars of 
alleviation costs or monetary transfers.  If we are correct that China’s carbon 
emissions growth will be significantly greater than current models predict, the 
already difficult task of reaching a workable climate accord135 becomes even 
more complicated. 
Before we proceed, one important note is in order.  The economic models 
used to predict Chinese emissions are complicated mathematical instruments.  
We are not econometricians or climate scientists, and it would be difficult (if 
not impossible) for us to challenge the mathematical details underlying these 
models.  However, these models also rely upon an explicit—and in some cases 
quite straightforward—set of assumptions about the functioning of markets, 
governments, and people.136  These assumptions are presumably quite sound in 
the preponderance of situations, and when applied to the preponderance of 
countries, but we do not believe that they are correct as applied to a type of 
“dual” nation like the Two Chinas we describe here.  We take direct aim at 
these assumptions below. 
A. The Environmental Models 
1. The IPAT Identity  
At its most simplistic level, the quantity of carbon dioxide produced by a 
nation’s citizens—indeed, the amount of any pollutant produced—is a function 
of three factors: 
1)  Population.  More people will naturally produce more carbon.   
2)  Affluence, or GDP.  Generally speaking, the greater a nation’s 
economic production, the greater the quantity of carbon it will generate 
in the course of running the factories and machinery that power the 
                                                 
135 See Eric Posner, Is a Climate Treaty Possible?, University of Chicago Faculty Blog, 
December 24, 2007, available at http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/12/is-a-climate-
tr.html. 
136 Our treatment of these models is guided by the approach to climate models (and 
mathematical models generally) suggested in Daniel A. Farber, Climate Models: A User’s Guide 
(unpublished manuscript 2007), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ abstract_id=1030607, which 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of various types of models and urges legal scholars to 
engage with them directly. 
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economy (and the more carbon that affluent consumers will produce in 
the course of their daily lives). 
3)  Technology.  Holding other factors equal, as a nation’s level of 
technology rises, it will find cleaner or more efficient methods of 
producing energy, and the amount of carbon generated (holding 
population and GDP constant) will decline. 
This relationship forms the basis for the foundational equation used in 
estimating environmental emissions:137 
(1)        I = P * A * T 
where I stands for pollution impact (essentially a measure of total 
pollution), P is population size, A is affluence (GDP), and T is a measure of 
the nation’s technology level.  As noted above, the assumption underlying this 
model is that “pollution should be monotonically increasing in P and A and 
monotonically decreasing for improvements in T.”138 
Other scientists have usefully decomposed this relationship into a series 
of identities:139 
(2)        CO2 emissions =  Population x   GDP    x  Energy   x  Carbon 
                                     Person       GDP          Energy 
The first two terms on the right side of this equation are simply a nation’s 
population and its per capita GDP.  The third quantity on the right side of 
equation, energy units per GDP, represents the energy intensity of a country’s 
economy; the fourth, carbon emissions per unit of energy, describes how 
carbon intensive (or how “dirty”) that nation’s energy production is.  
Combining these two quantities yields the equation: 
(3)        CO2 emissions =  Population x   GDP    x  Carbon 
            Person        GDP     
Much of the attention and effort in modeling carbon emissions centers 
around the final term in this equation.  That term, carbon emissions per unit of 
GDP, represents the amount of carbon a nation’s economy must generate in 
                                                 
137 Ehrlich and Holdren, Impact of Population Growth, Science, 1971; Holdren, 
Commentary: Environmental Degradation: Population, Affluence, Technology, and Sociopolitical 
Factors, Environment (2000). 
138 Aufhammer and Carson, supra note 133, at 3. 
139 C. Yang and S.H. Schneider, Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions Scenarios: Sensitivity to 
Social and Technological Factors in Three Regions, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for 
Global Change (1998); Kaya, 1990: Impact of Carbon Dioxide Emission Control on GNP 
Growth: Interpretation of Proposed Scenarios. Paper presented to the IPCC Energy and Industry 
Subgroup, Response Strategies Working Group, Paris.  This relationship is commonly known as 
the “Kaya Identity” in honor of its originator.  Id. 
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order to produce wealth, and is typically known simply as a nation’s “carbon 
intensity.”  The contrast between high-carbon intensity and low-carbon 
intensity economies can be striking, even to a casual observer.  The United 
States of the 1920s is a prime example of the former, characterized by 
booming industrial production, significant numbers of automobiles, and 
exclusively fossil-fuel powered electrical plants, all before the advent of fuel 
injection, smokestack scrubbers, or the Clean Air Act.  In 1920, the United 
States was producing over 2800 metric tons of carbon dioxide for every 
million dollars of GDP.  Low-carbon intensity economies come in a number of 
forms, ranging from, at one end of the spectrum, subsistence agriculture 
(which produces low levels of wealth but involves the burning of almost no 
fossil fuels), and at the other end a high-technology, environmentally 
conscious society that produces much of its energy through nuclear or 
renewable sources.  That would not seem an apt description of modern-day 
United States, but in fact American carbon intensity in 2004 was a 
comparatively judicious 566 metric tons of carbon dioxide for every million 
dollars of GDP, approximately 1/5 of its peak in the first half of the 20th 
Century.140 
Because of the obvious importance of trends in carbon intensity to 
predictions of national emissions growth, economists and climate scientists 
have focused on the creation of mathematical models that could be used to 
forecast this factor or, alternatively (and essentially equivalently), a nation’s 
per capita carbon emissions.141  The approach is quite straightforward: a 
forecast of carbon intensity, coupled with some standard assumptions 
regarding GDP growth over time, yields predictions of future carbon 
emissions.  Similarly, a forecast of per capita emissions, coupled with standard 
assumptions regarding population growth over time, also results in emissions 
predictions.  Projections of GDP and population growth are standard economic 
fare;142 the difficult step in forecasting emissions comes in finding a way to 
estimate future carbon intensity or per capita emissions.  Some divergence in 
methodology persists, but all of the leading approaches stem to some degree 
from a theory known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve. 
2. The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
                                                 
140 Calculated from Marland et al., supra note 77. 
141 Per capita emissions are simply the product of carbon intensity (carbon emissions per 
GDP) and per capita GDP, the final two terms in Equation 3.  From that equation it is easy to see 
that a forecast of per capita carbon emissions, coupled with forecasts of population growth, yield 
predictions of a country’s future carbon output. 
142 In fact, most emissions projections do not attempt to settle upon a single prediction of 
GDP growth, but rather employ a range of possible predictions, in some cases explicitly labeled as 
“high growth,” “standard,” or “low growth” predictions.  See, e.g., IEA, World Energy Outlook.  
The reported figures are usually for the standard, middle predictions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2008                     Preliminary Draft – Please Do Not Cite Without Permission 32 
 
In an influential 1955 paper, the economist Simon Kuznets proposed that 
economic inequality in a developing market economy would initially rise over 
time—as the nascent markets would heavily favor winners over losers—but at 
a certain would begin to fall as the society grew wealthier and citizens 
demanded social welfare and education programs from the government.143  
Kuznets’ theory predicted that a graph of economic inequality vs. per capita 
income would trace a parabolic, or inverted U-shaped curve.  
Figure 3: The Kuznets Curve144 
 
In 1991, two economists, Grossman and Krueger, suggested for the first 
time that the Kuznets curve might apply to environmental conditions as well as 
economic ones.  In a series of papers that began with an attempt to predict the 
impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on air quality, they 
found that “environmental degradation and income have an inverted U-shaped 
relationship”145—as societies grew richer their pollution levels first increased, 
until at a certain level of income they began to decrease.  This relationship 
became known, appropriately, as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (“EKC”); 
the income level at which environmental degradation would begin to decrease 
                                                 
143 Simon Kuznets, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” 45 American Economic 
Review 1 (1955); Yandle, Bhattarai, and Vijayaraghavan, Environmental Kuznets Curves: A 
Review of Findings, Methods, and Policy Implications. (2004), available at 
http://www.perc.org/about.php?id=688, at 2.  Kuznets was awarded the Nobel prize in economics 
for this theory in 1971. 
144 This figure is taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuznets_curve. 
145 Gene M. Grossman and Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 353-77 (1995). 
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(and environmental conditions improve) as societies invested greater wealth in 
environmental protection is the curve’s “turning point.” 
 
Figure 4: The Environmental Kuznets Curve146 
 
 
By now, environmental economists have found an inverted-U 
relationship between income and a wide variety of measures of air quality, 
including concentrations of sulfur dioxide, dark smoke (comprising a variety 
of chemical pollutants),147 carbon monoxide,148 nitrogen oxide, and suspended 
particulate matter.149  Studies have demonstrated the same relationship 
between income and water pollutants, including arsenic and lead.150  The 
                                                 
146 Yandle et al., supra note 143, at 3. 
147 Gene M. Grossman and Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impact of a North American 
Free Trade Agreement, Working Paper 3914 (1991). 
148 Thomas M. Seldon and Daqing Song, Environmental Quality and Develoopment: Is 
There a Kuznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 27, 147-62 (1994). 
149 M.A. Cole, A.J. Rayner, and J.M. Bates, The Environmental Kuznets Curve: An 
Empirical Analysis, Environment and Development Economics, 2, 401-16 (1997). 
150 Grossman and Krueger, supra note 145.  The income level at which the EKC turning 
point occurs (and environmental conditions begin to improve) is similarly the subject of some 
debate, and perhaps unsurprisingly economists have found different turning points for different 
pollutants.  As a class, however, air pollutants appear to have EKC turning points between 
$10,000 and $30,000 (in 2003 dollars), Cole et al., supra note149, while water pollutants have 
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evidence regarding carbon dioxide is somewhat less clear, and substantial 
academic debate exists as to whether the typical inverted-U relationship exists 
between per-capita income and a nation’s total CO2 emissions.151  However, a 
consensus has emerged among economists that the typical Kuznets 
relationship does hold between income and both per-capita CO2 emissions and 
carbon intensity—past a certain income level, individuals generate less carbon 
even if the nation as a whole does not.152  The history of U.S. carbon intensity 
follows just such a pattern:153 
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Figure 5: U.S. Carbon Intensity by Year
 
In many respects, the theory behind the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
closely tracks the theory that underlay the original economic Kuznets curve.  
At very low levels of per capita income, economies are principally agrarian 
                                                                                                           
slightly lower turning points, typically between $5000 and $10,000. Grossman and Krueger,supra 
note 145. 
151 Lieb, The Environmental Kuznets Curve and Flow versus Stock Pollution: The Neglect 
of Future Damages . Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 29, p. 483-506. 2002; Holtz-
Eakin and Selden, Stoking the Fires? CO2 Emissions and Economic Growth. Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 57, p. 85-101 (1995). 
152 Panayotou et al., Compensation for “Meaningful Participation” in Climate Change 
Control: A Modest Proposal and Empirical Analysis. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management. Vol 43, p. 437-454. 2002; Schmalensee et. al., World Carbon Dioxide Emissions: 
1950-2050. The Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 80, Issue 1, p. 15-27. 1998.  One study 
found that the turning point for per capita emissions occurs at approximately $11,500 per capita 
(in 1985 dollars).  Schmalensee. 
153 Calculated from Marland et al., supra note 77.. 
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and produce very little pollution.  As a nation industrializes, it consumes 
natural resources and emits pollution in the course of producing energy and 
goods.  Environmental protection is an extremely low priority—the country 
has experienced essentially no environmental damage, and economic growth is 
paramount.  At a certain point, increases in wealth will eventually drive 
decreases in pollution levels, although there is somewhat less agreement 
among economists as to the cause of this effect.  Some have hypothesized that 
environmental quality is a luxury good that consumers become willing to pay 
for as wealth levels increase;154 others have proposed that environmental 
improvements are simply not cost-benefit justified until a society’s levels of 
income and technology reach a certain point;155 some suggest that as countries 
develop their economies shift away from industrial manufacturing and towards 
comparatively less carbon-intensive service industries;156 and still others 
suggest that wealthy economies create conditions under which political 
economies favorable to environmental protection can develop.157 
In light of the empirical evidence supporting this inverted-U 
behavior158—and despite the lack of agreement on its precise causes159—the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve has been widely adopted as the foundation for 
models designed to forecast future pollution emissions.  Economists have 
                                                 
154 John M. Antle and Greg Heidebrink, Environment and Development: Theory and 
International Evidence, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 43, 603-25 (1995).  This 
theory in fact predates Grossman and Krueger’s 1991 paper.  According to Vernon Ruttan: 
In relatively high-income economies the income elasticity of demand for commodities and 
services related to sustenance is low and declines as income continues to rise, while the 
income elasticity of demand for more effective disposal of residuals and for environmental 
amenities is high and continues to rise. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in poor 
countries where the income elasticity of demand is high for sustenance and low for 
environmental amenities. 
Vernon Ruttan, Technology and the Environment, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
53, 707-08 (1971). 
155 James Andreoni and Arik Levinson, The Simple Analytics of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve, Journal of Public Economics, 80, 269-86 (2001); Magnus Lindmark, An EKC-
Pattern in Historical Perspective: Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Technology, Fuel Prices, and 
Growth in Sweden 1870-1997, 42 Ecological Economics, 333-47 (2002); Mohan Munasignhe, Is 
Environmental Degradation an Inevitable Consequence of Economic Growth: Tunneling through 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 29 Ecological Economics, 89-109 (1999) 
156 Jean Agras & Duane Chapman, A Dynamic Approach to the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve Hypothesis, 28 Ecological Economics 267, 274–75 (1999). 
157 Stephen F. Hayward, Jordi Roca, Do Individual Preferences Explain the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve?, Ecological Economics, 45, 3-10, 2003; Mariano Torras and James K. Boyce, 
Income Inequality, and Pollution: A Reassessment of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 
Ecological Economics, 25, 147-60 (1998). 
158 See supra notes 145–153 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 154–157 and accompanying text. 
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deployed models based upon the EKC to predict a variety of environmental 
conditions, including “ambient concentrations of SO2 . . . suspended 
particulate matter, lack of safe water, lack of urban sanitation, annual 
deforestation, municipal solid waste per capita and others” and, what is 
relevant here, per capita CO2 emissions.160 
3. EKC Assumptions in Chinese Emissions Models 
While EKC-based models represent in many respects the leading 
technological edge in emissions forecasting, for the most part the studies of 
Chinese emissions have not utilized them directly.  Rather, all of the leading 
Chinese carbon emissions forecasts—including the forecasts produced by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC);161 the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA);162 and numerous other economists and 
climate scientists163—employ models based upon Equations 2 and 3 above.164  
These models combine projections of China’s future population and economic 
growth with a variety of assumptions about the shape of the Chinese economy, 
its technological development, and the growth in its energy needs.  (We refer 
to these as the “standard” Chinese emissions models, to contrast them with the 
outliers that we will analyze below.)  The precise specifications vary 
                                                 
160Agras & Chapman, supra note 156, at 2.; See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Thomas M. 
Selden, Stoking the Fires?  CO2 Emissions and Economic Growth, 57 J. Public Econ. 85 (1995); 
Nemak Shafik & Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay, Economic Growth and Environmental Quality: Time-
Series and Cross-Country Evidence, World Development Report Background Paper, 1992; 
Schmalensee et al., World Carbon Dioxide Emissions: 1950-2050 (1998). 
161 The IPCC is a multinational non-governmental organization that shared the 2007 Nobel 
Peace Prize with former Vice President Al Gore.  See generally http://www.ipcc.ch. 
162 The EIA is the federal U.S. agency charged with producing the government’s official 
energy forecasts. See generally http://www.eia.doe.gov/. 
163 E.g., Zhang, Z.: 2000, Decoupling China's Carbon Emissions Increase from Economic 
Growth: An Economic Analysis and Policy Implications, World Development 28(4), 739-752 
(2000); Yang & Schneider, supra note 139, at 373–4042, 373-404. 
164 The technical details of how these models differ from EKC-based projections are not of 
great importance to the analysis that follows, but a brief description may be useful in explicating 
the key similarities.  EKC-based forecasts, described in Section III.A.3., supra, are so-called 
“reduced form” models that attempt to compress several unknown variables into a single quantity 
and model that quantity directly.  (The name derives from the fact that an equation has been 
reduced to include fewer unknown variables.)  For instance, many of the EKC models combine the 
final two terms in Equation 3, per capita GNP and carbon intensity, into a single term representing 
per capita carbon emissions and attempt to model this term directly, thus reducing the number of 
unknown terms on the right side of the equation from three to two.  The models described here are 
so-called “structural” models that avoid this compression of terms and attempt to model each 
quantity directly.  Unlike a reduced-form model, a structural model might attempt to forecast each 
of the terms on the right side of Equation 2 or 3 directly.  Of course, this nevertheless requires that 
the model predict carbon intensity, or carbon emissions per unit of energy (“carbon intensity of 
energy”) along with energy usage per dollar of GDP (“energy intensity”).  It is for this reason that 
environmental economists think of structural models and reduced-form models as close cousins. 
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substantially, and many of the models are highly complex.165  Nonetheless, the 
models are more notable for their similarities than their differences.  Despite 
their many varieties, these models have generated reasonably consistent 
predictions.  All of the standard studies project that Chinese CO2 emissions 
will grow at an annual rate of approximately 2.5% to 5% through 2010.166 
Moreover, all of the standard models share two fundamental and crucial 
theoretical characteristics.  First, each model assumes that China’s carbon 
intensity will decrease substantially over time.167  That is, these models assume 
that China is on the downward slope (the right-hand side) of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve—that it resembles the post-1920s United 
States,168 with growing demands for environmental quality, rising proportions 
of economic growth occurring in the services sector, and rapidly deploying 
environmental technologies.  This is, on its face, quite a reasonable 
assumption.  China cut its carbon intensity by 50% between 1994 and 2004 
(although this trend has stabilized somewhat in recent years, with carbon 
intensity falling only 0.8% between 2001 and 2004, the last year for which 
                                                 
165 For instance, the IPCC runs six distinct models across a variety of projected inputs to 
generate approximately 40 different emissions scenarios.  IPCC Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios, available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/050.htm, at 3. 
166 See Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2007, at 76 
(2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html (forecasting 3.4% growth); 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 2000, Emissions Scenarios (2000) (forecasting 2.58-
4.82% growth); Energy Research Institute: 2004, China’s Sustainable Energy Future: Scenarios of 
Energy and Carbon Emissions, Technical Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2004) 
(forecasting 4.18% growth); D. Fridley, China’s Energy Future to 2020, Technical Report, 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2006) (forecasting 5.00–5.02% growth); K. Jiang and X. 
Hu, Energy Demand and Emissions in 2030 in China: Scenarios and Policy Options, 
Environmental and Policy Studies, 7, 233-250 (2006) (forecasting 4.12% growth); Yang & 
Schneider, supra note 139, at 373–404(forecasting 1.93–3.10% growth over a longer period (2000 
to 2025)). 
167 E.g., IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, available at 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/102.htm#box47 (“Invariably, intensities are projected 
to decline with increasing income levels.”); EIA 2007 Emissions Report, at 76 (“In all countries 
and regions, carbon dioxide intensity—expressed in emissions per unit of economic output—are 
projected to improve (decline) over the projection period as the world economy moves into a post-
industrial phase.”).  These assumptions are not always explicit; the models will occasionally 
assume that, for instance, the portion of a country’s GDP produced by manufacturing industries 
will decrease consistently over time, or that a country will shift away from using coal for 
electricity generation at a consistent rate over time.  Because manufacturing is more carbon 
intensive per dollar than service industries, and because coal is more carbon-intensive per unit of 
energy than natural gas and nuclear power, these assumptions are functionally equivalent to the 
broader presumption that carbon intensity will fall over time.  Indeed, most economists believe 
that it is some combination of these underlying factors that drives the EKC-type behavior of 
carbon intensity in the first place.  See supra notes 154–157 and accompanying text. 
168 See Figure 1, supra. 
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reliable data exist).169  The history of Chinese carbon intensity resembles the 
familiar Kuznets shape:170 
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Figure 6: Chinese Carbon Intensity by Year
 
We will argue, however, that this assumption may not be reasonable for all 
parts of China. 
                                                 
169 Calculated from Marland et al., supra note 77, and GDP data available at 
chinadataonline.org; see also Lin Jiang et al., Achieving China’s Target for Energy Intensity 
Reduction in 2010: An Exploration of Recent Trends and Possible Future Scenarios, 
Environmental Energy Technologies Division, Laurence Berkeley National Laboratory (2006)at 3 
(“[E]conomic development in China over the last few years suggests that China may have lost its 
ability or will to sustain a drive to reduce energy intensity, a policy that has been central to 
achievement of other of its development goals. Since 2001, China has experienced much faster 
growth in energy use than economic growth, with an elasticity reaching 1.6 in 2004.”). 
170 Calculated from Marland et al., supra note 77, and GDP data available at 
chinadataonline.org.  A few features of this graph are worthy of comment.  First, the peculiar 
double-peaked shape is likely due to Mao’s Cultural Revolution, which ran from 1966 until 
approximately 1976 and involved substantial economic disruptions.  See Lieberthal, supra note 19, 
at 116.(“The economy largely stagnated because of disruptions in transportation, decline in worker 
discipline, and the virtual disruption of the central economic statistical apparatus.”).  The Cultural 
Revolution coincides almost precisely with the second run-up in carbon intensity, which began in 
1967 and peaked in 1977.  Second, Figure 4 reports Chinese carbon intensity in metric tons of CO2 
per million yuan of GDP, rather than per million dollars.  Exchange rates have typically hovered in 
the vicinity of 7-8.5 yuan/dollar, see 
http://finance.yahoo.com/currency/convert?from=USD&to=CNY&amt=1&t=5y, and so China’s 
carbon intensity in 2004 (which appears quite low from Figure 4) was approximately 2200 metric 
tons of carbon per million dollars of GDP (not adjusted for purchasing power parity), or about four 
times that of the United States. 
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Second, and relatedly, every forecast of Chinese carbon emissions—with 
two important exceptions, which we discuss in greater detail below171—
employs only country-level data.172  In other words, the models rely upon 
emissions data for the nation of China as a whole, as opposed to emissions 
data by region or province.  Under the right conditions, conditions that we 
believe are present here, the combination of country-level data and aggressive 
assumptions regarding trends in energy intensity can skew forecasts of future 
emissions quite dramatically.  We describe and analyze the errors we believe 
these two key characteristics have generated below. 
B.  Errors in Chinese Emissions Forecasts 
1. The Two-Nation Problem 
Consider two neighboring countries, Country A and Country B.  Country 
A is highly industrialized and has been for more than a decade.  Its citizens 
have achieved a relatively high level of wealth (past the EKC turning point for 
carbon intensity), but the country is beginning to suffer from significant 
environmental degradation, including heavy smog overhanging the major 
cities and occasionally dangerously high levels of pollutants in the drinking 
water.  The citizens of Country A have begun to demand governmental 
measures to improve environmental quality, including curbs on carbon 
emissions, and Country A’s economy has begun to shift from industry to 
services as its population becomes wealthier.173  An economist examining 
historical data would observe that Country A’s per capita carbon emissions 
have begun to trend downwards—Country A is on the downward slope of its 
Environmental Kuznets Curve.  Assuming that per capita income in Country A 
is likely to increase monotonically with time, Country A’s carbon intensity 
(including future projections) might look approximately like this: 
 
                                                 
171 Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133; International Energy Agency, World Energy 
Outlook 2007. 
172 See note 166, supra, and sources cited therein. 
173 SeeJiang et al., supra note 169, at 2 (“In the later stage of economic development, 
demand 
for services often grows faster than demand for goods, leading to a shift in economic 
structure towards the service sector which has much lower energy and material intensity.”); Agras 
& Chapman, supra note 156 (making a similar point). 
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Figure 7: Country A’s Carbon Intensity over Time 
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Country B is quite a bit different.  Country B has a population 
approximately four fifths 5 the size of Country A, but unlike Country A it is 
much poorer and relatively agrarian—a smaller proportion of Country B’s 
citizens work in industry, and fewer of its citizens reside in cities, and Country 
B produces only 40% of the GDP of Country A.  At the same time, and not 
surprisingly, Country B produces comparatively little pollution and has fewer 
significant environmental problems; for the citizens of Country B, economic 
growth and development are the highest priorities.  Accordingly, fueled by a 
tremendous influx of foreign investment, Country B is embarking upon a 
program of intensive industrialization and urbanization.  An economist 
examining historical data would observe that Country B’s carbon intensity has 
increased over time—Country B is on the upward slope of its Environmental 
Kuznets Curve.174  Again, assuming that Country B’s per-capita income will 
increase monotonically, Country B’s carbon intensity (including future 
projections) might look approximately like this: 
 
                                                 
174 See Jiang et al., supra note 173, at 2 (“In the early stage of economic development, 
industrialization and urbanization tend to lead to extensive infrastructure and housing 
development: both are energy- and material-intensive activities.  As a result, energy intensity tends 
to increase.”). 
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Figure 8: Country B’s Per Capita Carbon Emissions 
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An economist analyzing Country A and Country B side-by-side would 
observe from the data that the two nations are at differing points in 
development, and thus that their emissions are likely to follow different paths 
in the succeeding decades.  Country B’s emissions will grow more rapidly as it 
continues to industrialize; as its citizens purchase ever greater numbers of 
automobiles; and as it supplies its energy needs through the construction of 
new coal plants.  Country A’s emissions, by contrast, will increase much more 
slowly as it switches to more energy-efficient technologies and transitions to a 
post-industrial service economy. 
Now, imagine for a moment that Country A has annexed Country B to 
form a new, larger Country C.  Country C is no different from the 
conglomerate Countries A+B—it has the same population, the same growth 
patterns, the same environmental problems (in one area) and lack thereof (in 
another), and so forth.  However, because Country A is so much more 
prosperous than Country B—it contributes more than 70% of the total two-
nation GDP—the historical data on Country C would strongly resemble the 
data on Country A alone.  In particular, an economist would observe that, like 
Country A, Country C’s per capita carbon emissions have begun to trend 
downwards—Country C is also on the downward slope of its Environmental 
Kuznets Curve.  Lacking any knowledge of Country C’s internal 
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heterogeneity, the economist would predict that Country C’s per capita carbon 
emissions would follow a downward trend similar to Country A’s.  Country 
A’s dominant economy would largely obscure the localized upward trends in 
carbon intensity present in Country B. 
By now the reader is undoubtedly aware that Country C is China, and 
Countries A and B are, respectively, the fictitious Eastern China and Western 
China.  And yet Chinese emissions forecasts may have succumbed to precisely 
the problems this story suggests.175  Every carbon emissions model, save two, 
employs exclusively country-level Chinese data; every model, save one, 
assumes that per-capita carbon emissions are trending downwards throughout 
all of China; and thus every emissions projection with that single exception is 
vulnerable to underestimating the future contribution of industrializing 
Western China to Chinese carbon output.  The clearest evidence for our theory 
lies in the divergent approaches taken by these two outlying econometric 
models—and their divergent results. 
2. The International Energy Agency and Sub-National Data 
The first of these two outlier studies, the International Energy Agency’s 
(IEA) World Energy Outlook for 2007, does not deviate significantly in 
methodology or results from the standard models.176  Nevertheless, its few 
points of departure are instructive.  In 2007, for the first time, the IEA’s global 
forecast included sub-national data on China.177    The forecast examined 
China’s coastal regions separately: it modeled eleven coastal Chinese 
provinces and cities as one area and modeled the remainder of China 
(comprising thirteen provinces and several administrative regions) as 
another.178  The IEA’s line of demarcation matches neither our classification 
                                                 
175 Two leading China scholars note: 
As in many countries, there is no one clear tendency in China.  We can observe neither 
an overall tendency towards environmental decay jeopardising the global sustenance 
base, nor a general trend towards greening the economic, political and social 
institutions and practices. Understanding and interpreting current environmental 
developments in China in terms of a national environmental Kuznets curve, makes little 
sense. To evaluate the way that China is currently dealing with environmental 
problems and challenges, and the successes, failures and dilemmas it faces, we are in 
need of much more detailed analyses and insight into various institutional 
developments and social practices. 
Mol & Carter, supra note 104, at 149, 151 (emphasis added). 
176 The International Energy Agency, a non-governmental organization based in Paris, 
publishes annual climate and emissions forecasts for the entire globe.  See http://www.iea.org. 
177 International Energy Agency, World Energy Model—Methodology and Assumptions, 
available at  http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/docs/weo2007/WEM_Methodology_07.pdf, at 
3.  The IEA has been publishing global energy forecasts for quite a number of years, and so this 
was a significant departure from past practice. 
178 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (hereafter “IEA”), at 404 (2007). 
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of Western China, which is based upon economic indicators, nor the CCP’s 
delineation of the area covered by its Western Development Program,179 but it 
is not terribly far afield.  The inland (western) region as defined by the IEA 
contains 793 million people (61% of China’s total population)180 and produces 
40% of its GDP;181 Western China as we define it here contains 574 million 
people (45% of China’s population) and produces only 29% of its GDP.182  If 
anything, the economic differences between Inland China and Coastal China 
as delineated by the IEA are even more stark than the differences between 
Eastern and Western China as we define them here.  Per the IEA’s geographic 
definitions, the coastal (eastern) region’s per-capita GDP is 2.26 times higher 
than the western region’s;183 by our definitions, Eastern China’s per-capita 
GDP is 1.99 times higher than Western China’s.184 
Unfortunately, however, the IEA paints over this clear divide between 
East and West with a critical set of largely indiscriminate assumptions.  
Principally among them is the growth of the services sector of the Chinese 
economy.  The IEA’s projections of future carbon emissions are driven 
substantially by its assumptions about the share of GDP produced within the 
services sector.185  (Recall that services, because they produce less carbon than 
industry, are a key determinant of a nation’s carbon intensity.186)   According 
to the IEA, in 2005 the services sector was responsible for 40% of GDP in the 
east and 38% of GDP in the west; the IEA assumes that services will grow to 
43% of GDP in both locations by 2015 (implying faster services growth 
inland).187  In all likelihood, these assumptions are most highly unrealistic—
                                                 
179 See note 58, supra. 
180 IEA, supra note178, at 255.  China has a total population of approximately 1.3 billion.  
Id. at 59. 
181 Id. at 403. 
182 See supra note 46–47 and accompanying text. 
183 Calculated from http://www.chinadataonline.org based upon the definitions in note 178, 
supra. 
184 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  This fact should dispel any notion that we 
might have cherry-picked the data or drawn an arbitrary line in order to accentuate the divergence 
between East and West.  Ours is obviously not the most extreme line (on economic grounds) that 
could have been drawn; we chose it in substantial part to demonstrate geographic and ethnic, as 
well as economic, differences.  (More to the point, the raison d’être of this exercise was to 
illustrate the stark divide between East and West; on that account, we cannot be guilty of cherry-
picking unless we have somehow gerrymandered the Chinese boundary line.  Cf. Samuel 
Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 592 (2002) (discussing 
American political gerrymandering). 
185 IEA, supra  note 178, at 285–85, 407. 
186 See Jiang et al., supra note 173, at 2 (noting that services are far less resource-intensive 
than industries); Agras & Chapman, supra note 156. 
187 IEA, supra  note 178, at 284–85, 407. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2008                     Preliminary Draft – Please Do Not Cite Without Permission 44 
 
the less-developed west is unlikely to see its services sector grow more rapidly 
than the east—and make sense only if Western China’s economy already 
resembles Eastern China’s in substantial part.188  The effect of the IEA’s 
combination of assumptions and definitional choices is to wash out a 
substantial portion of China’s East-West heterogeneity, muting the effects of 
examining the Two Chinas independently. 
Nonetheless, the IEA’s projections do manage to exploit some 
distinctions between Inland and Coastal China.  The IEA predicts that carbon 
emissions will grow 5.2% annually over the next decade in Coastal China189 
and 5.6% annually in Inland China.190  Over the same time period, carbon 
intensity will decline by 2.6% annually in Coastal China and 1.5% annually in 
Inland China.191  Even by picking up this minimal variation, the IEA arrives at 
slightly higher projections than any of the other models we have described 
thus far: Chinese emissions growth of 5.4% over the next decade.192  The 
IEA’s forecast is certainly superior to the typical Chinese models (which will 
naturally assume consistent rates of declining carbon intensity through the 
country).  At the same time, no model of Chinese emissions will succeed in 
fully accounting for China’s geographic heterogeneity unless it utilizes 
province-level data and permits substantial variance in economic trends among 
provinces, allowing for the possibility that some provinces are currently on the 
upward slope of their Environmental Kuznets Curves.  Alone among Chinese 
carbon projections, the study that follows possesses both of these features. 
3. Modeling Heterogeneity: The Auffhammer and Carson Study 
In a 2007 study, Maximilian Auffhammer and Richard T. Carson re-
calculate projected Chinese carbon emissions through 2010.193  Their study 
                                                 
188 See Jiang et al., supra note 173, at 2 (explaining the different stages in development at 
which various sectors of the economy typically grow); Agras & Chapman, supra note 156. 
189 IEA, supra  note 178, at 415. 
190 This figure is calculated by the authors from IEA predictions of emissions growth in 
Coastal China, id., emissions growth in China as a whole, id. at 313, and the proportion of 
emissions currently produced by Coastal China, id. at 415.  The IEA does not release separate data 
on its predictions for Inland China. 
191 These figures are calculated by the authors from IEA predictions of GDP growth in 
Coastal China, id. at 407, China as a whole, id. at 284, and the preceding predictions on emissions 
growth.  The similar rates of emissions growth in Inland and Coastal China indicate that the 
different trends in carbon intensity are driven substantially by different rates of GDP growth. 
192 Id. at 313.  This is not a perfectly tuned comparison; the results we report earlier are 
from predictions of Chinese emissions growth over the next five years, while the IEA results 
represent predictions over the next ten years.  The IEA does not release year-by-year data or any 
other information that would allow us to bridge this discrepancy.  If anything, however, these 
numbers likely understate the IEA’s projections of Chinese emissions over the next five years, 
which are likely to be higher than the five years that follow. 
193 Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133. 
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differs methodologically from previous work in two principal respects. 194  
First, Auffhammer and Carson “allow for spatial dependence in emissions 
across provinces, which has been shown to improve forecasts of aggregate 
variables if there is sufficient heterogeneity at lower levels of 
aggregation”195—in other words, they employ province-level data.196  
Substantial geographic heterogeneity is certainly present in China; in 2004, the 
“coastal provinces” of Eastern China, which account for only 14% of the 
country’s land area, produced 54% of the country’s carbon emissions.197  
Second, unlike other projections of China’s carbon output, Auffhammer and 
Carson forecast future emissions using a model based upon the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve.198  Consequently, Auffhammer and Carson do not assume that 
any (much less every) Chinese province will have uniformly decreasing per 
capita carbon emissions; they allow each province’s emissions to fall on either 
the upward or the downward slope of the curve, as appropriate. 
Auffhammer and Carson’s results diverge strikingly from all of the 
foregoing projections of Chinese carbon emissions.  As noted above, the 
standard models forecast that Chinese CO2 emissions will grow at an annual 
rate of approximately 2.5% to 5% through 2010.199   Auffhammer and Carson, 
by contrast, predict that during the same period Chinese CO2 emissions will 
grow at an annual rate greater than 11%, even assuming relatively 
conservative Chinese economic growth rates.200  (By way of comparison, U.S. 
                                                 
194 Auffhammer and Carson state at the beginning of their paper that they are making four 
contributions to the literature.  However, two of those contributions relate directly to “spatial 
dependence in emissions across provinces”—in other words, the province-level heterogeneity in 
emissions we discuss here—a third involves a dynamic search for the best theoretical model 
among a variety of pre-existing candidates (none of which should cause their results to diverge 
substantially from what other studies have found), and the fourth is simply their selection of an 
“annually updated and publicly available source of data, which allows for frequently updateable 
forecasts” but again should have little or no effect on their current results.  As the title of their 
paper indicates, their results are begin drive by the province-level data they employ.  Id. at 2–3. 
195 Id. at 2. 
196 Auffhammer has elsewhere achieved superior predictive results using region-level 
emissions data.  See, e.g., Aufhammer and Steinhauser, The Future Trajectory of CO2 Emissions: 
The Role of State v. Aggregate Information. Journal of Regional Science. Vol. 57 (5). 
197 Id. at 9.  Auffhammer and Carson count as “coastal provinces” the provinces of 
Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hainan, 
Guangdong, and Guangxi.  The exact designations are not particularly important, though, because 
Auffhammer and Carson have province-level data and thus do not need to arbitrarily divide the 
country in the fashion of the IEA.  See supra note 178. 
198 Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 3. 
199 See note 166, supra, and sources cited therein; see also Auffhammer & Carson, supra 
note 133, at 29 (referencing prior studies). 
200 Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 29.  More aggressive estimates of China’s 
economic growth result in carbon emissions growth rates closer to 12%.  Id. 
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emissions have grown at an approximate annual rate of 1.5% over the past 
decade.201)  If Auffhammer and Carson are correct, the standard projections 
could be underestimating China’s emissions output by literally hundreds of 
millions of tons of carbon dioxide over the next half-decade.202  We discuss 
the significance of this potential underestimation in Part III. 
Auffhammer and Carson do not suggest any particular explanation for 
the profound effects generated by their introduction of province-level data, nor 
do they theorize regarding the internal state of affairs in China that might give 
rise to divergent growth patterns.  They mention in passing the fact that their 
model predicts slower emissions growth in eastern than western provinces, but 
they do not investigate the point.203  We believe that the explanation for their 
highly distinctive empirical predictions findings lies in the theory we advance 
here. 
Of course, it is possible that Auffhammer and Carson are not correct (by 
which we mean no more accurate than other extant models).204  Moreover, this 
lone study, by itself, proves nothing with regard to our central theory.205  But 
we find it arresting that it has achieved such atypical results—in the direction 
                                                 
201 Calculated from data contained in Marland et al., supra note 77. 
202 This estimate is based upon our own calculations and discussed in Part III.C., infra. 
203 They write: 
There is considerable variation in individual provinces’ elasticities with respect to the 
previous period's emissions, as indicated by the parameters on the province specific lagged 
emissions.  A smaller parameter estimate on a province's lagged per capita waste gas 
emissions indicates faster  speed of adjustment. Correspondingly, a larger (closer to one) 
parameter estimate would indicate a relatively slower rate of adjustment. Upon casual 
inspection, the provinces with lagged parameter values that are substantially below the 
average tend to be the coastal provinces that have received substantial FDI, whereas the 
provinces with substantially higher lagged parameter values tend to be provinces which are 
large coal producers with substantial concentrations of heavy industry. The estimates are 
consistent with current efforts to decrease emissions of air pollutants in provinces hosting 
Olympic events as well as provinces which are attracting the majority of foreign tourists, 
which are largely the coastal provinces with lower estimated lag parameters. 
Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133, at 17. 
204 Although there is substantial evidence in its favor.  Auffhammer and Carson’s model 
generates retrospective predictions for emissions from 2000 through 2003 that are far closer to 
observed CO2 emissions than any of the competing models.  See Auffhammer & Carson, supra 
note 133, at 29; Marland et al., supra note 77.. 
205 This is by no means a perfect apples-to-apples comparison, because Auffhammer and 
Carson employ a slightly different methodology than the standard structural models.  Again, the 
conclusions we advance here are tentative.  However, we believe that the principal effect of 
Auffhammer and Carson’s different methodological tack is to capture the heterogeneity among 
Chinese provinces and cure the problems that attend projections based only on nation-level 
Chinese data, and we mean only to argue that Auffhammer and Carson’s results are suggestive, 
not that they are dispositive. 
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the theory would predict—through little more than the substitution of 
province-level data.  If our theory of western development and its effect on 
future Chinese emissions were correct one would expect to find echoes of this 
phenomenon within the data.  If nothing else, Auffhammer and Carson’s study 
provides evidence of those echoes. 
C.   Pitfalls and Shortcuts 
There is, of course, nothing magical about the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve, no law of nature that condemns a nation (or part of one) to trace its 
entire length.  In many cases, a developing nation simply does not have the 
technology—smokestack scrubbers, wind or solar generators, nuclear plans—
necessary to produce high levels of per-capita GDP at (comparably) low levels 
of per capita carbon emissions.  This is not so for Western China.  The 
possibility exists that it could experience a great leap forward (to borrow a 
phrase206) in development and pollution abatement through the intervention of 
the more technologically advanced East.  In so doing, Western China could 
short-circuit the natural growth of emissions that a Kuznets-based approach 
would predict and advance directly to the comparatively advanced point on the 
curve that Eastern China has already achieved. 
For a variety of reasons, however, this is unlikely to occur.  Recall that 
the Kuznets curve effect—like other relationships of its type—is economically 
driven, with technology only one input.207  Despite the fact that it is rapidly 
industrializing, Western China is not yet wealthy; the per-capita income 
among the western provinces is only 9,967 yuan (approximately $1,330), 
compared with 19,813 yuan ($2,640) in the East.208 Moreover, generally 
speaking, Western China has not yet developed the type of pollution problems 
that already plagues the more developed East.  (Eastern China, for example, is 
already heavily polluted and has experienced a number of violent 
demonstrations in response to declining environmental conditions.  In April 
2005 60,000 people rioted in the southeastern province of Zhejiang in protest 
of pollution from nearby chemical plants.209  Later that same year, 15,000 
people rioted in the town of Xinchang, 180 miles south of Shanghai, 
“overturning police cars and throwing stones for hours, undeterred by thick 
                                                 
206 For a discussion of the Great Leap Forward and its consequences see Lieberthal, supra 
note 19, at 103–09. 
207 See notes 154–157, supra, and accompanying text. 
208 Note 50, supra. 
209 Yardley, “Thousands of Chinese Villagers Protest Factory Pollution,” New York Times, 
April 13, 2005.  The protest succeeded in persuading the Chinese government to relocate the six 
plants.  Cody, “For Chinese, Peasant Revolt Is Rare Victory; Farmers Beat Back Police in Battle 
over Pollution,” Washington Post, June 13, 2005. 
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clouds of tear gas,” in opposition to a ten-year-old pharmaceutical plant.210  
And in March of 2008, 10,000 people protested the construction of a new 
petrochemical plant in Xiamen, a port city in southeastern China, causing the 
central government to suspend the project.211) 
In addition, while some environmentally-focused non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have sprung into existence in China, there is no strong 
evidence that an influential environmental movement exists within the 
country.  Surveys suggest that environmental protection is low on the list of 
issues that citizens want the CCP to address.212  Citizens state that economic 
growth should be prioritized over environmental concerns, with more attention 
to the environment in policy preferences at specific levels of development.213  
For most Chinese, both in the East and the West, corruption, income 
inequality, regional disparities, and the breakdown of the social safety net are 
more prominent concerns than environmental degradation.  The sort of 
domestic political forces that some economists have theorized as driving a 
reversal of the EKC does not appear to exist, at this point, anywhere in China 
(much less Western China in particular). 
Consequently, on any theory of how the Kuznets Curve operates, 
Western China is unlikely to leap ahead despite the presence of its wealthier 
neighbor.  If environmental quality is a luxury good,214 Eastern China’s 
existence will not alter the fact that citizens of Western China have not yet 
reached the level of affluence at which they would be willing to pay for it.  If 
the Kuznets curve relationship is driven by the political economies of 
environmental protections,215 the necessary conditions for a political 
movement to arise—principally wealth, and also salient economic problems—
are not yet present in Western China, irrespective of whether they exist in 
Eastern China.  And certainly the Western Chinese economy, which remains 
in the early stages of industrialization, is quite a long way from reorienting 
towards a fully post-industrial service-based economy like the modern United 
States.  If that is the motivating factor behind the Kuznets rise and fall of 
                                                 
210 Howard W. French, “Anger in China Rises over Threat to Environment,” New York 
Times, July 19, 2005. 
211 Edward Cody, Protest Over Factory Spreads in China, Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/03/AR2008030301072.html 
212 See Phillip Stalley & Dongning Yang, An Emerging Environmental Movement in China? 
CHINA QUARTERLY 333 (2006). 
213 See Yanqi Tong, Bureaucracy Meets the Environment: Elite Perceptions in Six Chinese 
Cities, 189 CHINA QUARTERLY 100 (2007). 
214 See note 154, supra, and accompanying text. 
215 See note 157, supra, and accompanying text. 
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carbon intensity,216 Eastern China will hardly enable Western China to skip 
ahead on the curve. 
At the same time, Western China will find it cheaper to curb carbon 
emissions, compared with other similarly developed regions, due to the higher 
level of technology available in the East.  If it is a straightforward cost-benefit 
calculus that drives the EKC,217 Western China may traverse the curve more 
rapidly through its lower-cost access to Eastern Chinese technology.  This is, 
without question, the most optimistic view of the future of carbon emissions in 
Western China.  At the same time, however, it represents only one side of the 
cost-benefit equation. Western China has not experienced the same level of 
environmental degradation as its neighbor to the East.218 Rather than 
concerning themselves with pollution, local officials continue to push for 
greater and more rapid economic growth, at the lowest cost and on the shortest 
time scale possible.219  Not surprisingly, the power plants being built in 
Western China are coal-fired; the factories being installed contain no special 
scrubbers or carbon abatement equipment.220  Indeed, “[t]here are filters 
available that can cut smokestack emissions by 95 percent, but the government 
has been unable to get local leaders to pay for them or other Western 
technologies that could clean up power stations.”221  Officials in Western 
China appear willing to sacrifice environmental protection for industrial 
growth, at least in the short term. 
We hasten to add that of course the Environmental Kuznets Curve is a 
theory about economic growth and pollution, not an irrefutable law of nature.  
The EKC relationship has not been proven—it has only been demonstrated.  
We mean only to claim that Western China is no less likely to follow a 
standard EKC pattern of growth and emissions than any other country at a 
similar stage in development, the existence of Eastern China notwithstanding.  
The available evidence offers no fundamental reason to believe that Western 
China will avoid the growth in per capita emissions that has characterized 
nearly every other similarly situated society.  
                                                 
216 See note 156, supra, and accompanying text. 
217 See note 156, supra, and accompanying text. 
218 See text accompanying supra notes 209–211. 
219 “According to a survey conducted by the provincial bureau for environmental protection, 
90 percent of mayors and local cadres were opposed to any moves that protected the environment 
or could slow the country's economic growth.”  Coal Emissions Blanket China with Pollution, 
http://www.naturalnews.com/021386.html  
220 Ben Kage, Coal Emissions Blanket China with Pollution, NATURAL NEWS (Jan. 4, 
2007), available at http://www.naturalnews.com/021386.html. 
221 Id. 
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D.   Ramifications 
As Cass Sunstein and others have noted, attempts to reach a global 
accord on greenhouse gases are hamstrung by a fundamental problem: China, 
already the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases,222 would incur the 
highest costs of any nation if carbon emissions are taxed or capped.  At the 
same time, however, China faces comparatively little downside risk from 
global warming.223  (A similar problem, though not to quite the same degree, 
exists with respect to the United States.224)  As a matter of pure economic self-
interest, China has little reason to support a global climate agreement.225 
The possibility that Chinese carbon emissions may be increasing at an 
annual rate of over 11%, rather than approximately 4%, as previous models 
would have it, stands to exacerbate this problem substantially.  In 2004, the 
last year for which there exists reliable data, China emitted over 1.3 billion 
metric tons of carbon.226  If Auffhammer and Carson are correct, China will 
emit approximately 12 billion metric tons of carbon from 2005 through 2010; 
according to the standard calculations, China will emit slightly more than 9.4 
billion metric tons over the same period.227  This disparity amounts to 2.6 
billion metric tons of carbon over six years, or an increase of 27% over 
previous forecasts.  If the costs to China of complying with a global emissions 
accord were viewed as unaffordable on standard accounts of emissions 
growth, they are flatly prohibitive according to Auffhammer and Carson’s 
(likely correct) numbers.  Suppose, by way of illustration, that a proposed 
climate agreement assumed the form of a global tax on carbon emissions.228  
                                                 
222 China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE 
(June 20, 2007), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/20/business/emit.php. 
223 One projection suggests that China will suffer damages equivalent to 0.22% of GDP 
from 2.5 degree warming, compared with 0.45% in the United States, 0.50 in Japan, 2.83 in 
Western Europe, and even higher losses in India and Africa.  Sunstein, supra note 1, at 11; 
NORHAUS & BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD (2000).  Only Russia stands to fare better than China; 
global warming may actually improve its economy.  Id. 
224 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that the United States stands to lose much less 
from global warming than many other countries, including many other industrialized countries). 
225 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 18. 
226 Marland et al., supra note 77..  Note that we give the measure here in tons of carbon, 
rather than tons of carbon dioxide, as is the convention among many climate scientists.  In order to 
calculate emissions in terms of carbon dioxide, one would simply multiply the tonnage of carbon 
by 3.667, which is the ratio of the two molecules’ molecular weights. 
227 Figures calculated by the authors based upon data from Marland et al., supra note 77, 
and projections from Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 133. 
228 This is one of two options that economists have proposed, the other being a “cap-and-
trade system” in which nations (and, at a more local level, industries) receive emissions permits 
that trade on the open market.  Though the example in the text employs a carbon tax, the cost to 
China of increased emissions under a cap-and-trade system would be very similar; under either 
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William Nordhaus, perhaps the leading economist in this field, has proposed a 
tax that would start at $27 per metric ton of emitted carbon229 and rise 2-3% 
each year.230  At those prices, the additional (per Auffhammer and Carson’s 
calculations) 2.6 billion tons of carbon that China will emit from 2005-2010 
alone would cost it approximately $76 billion extra in taxes.231 
*  *  * 
In sum, we argued in Parts I and II that China’s internal politics and its 
plans to continue the extensive industrialization of the West will severely 
complicate efforts to involve China in a global climate accord.  Here, we 
attempted to demonstrate that China’s pattern of development will in fact lead 
to substantially greater carbon emissions over the next several decades than all 
but one model has forecast, and we provide a theoretical basis to substantiate 
that lone model’s findings.  The question that remains is whether China’s 
development will prove fatal to any possible agreement to limit emissions, or 
whether the framework exists for an accord that would both accommodate 
China’s economic destiny and prove politically feasible within the United 
States. 232  We take up this question in the Part that follows. 
 
                                                                                                           
system the goal is simply to set the price of carbon appropriately.  We explore these two options in 
slightly more detail in Part IV, infra. 
229 Nordhaus, A Question of Balance, 
http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/Balance_2nd_proofs.pdf, at 11–15.  Nordhaus estimates the social 
cost of emitting a ton of carbon at $30, and calculated after running a variety of simulations that a 
tax of $27 would optimally maximize worldwide wealth.  Id.  These figures might be rather on the 
low side: carbon emissions permits are currently trading in the European Union at nearly $50 per 
metric ton, and the IEA has suggested that carbon will have to be priced at $200-$500 per ton 
before global warming can be halted or reversed.  Ed Crooks, IEA Calls for Environmental 
Revolution, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 7, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fd0eeb98-
342a-11dd-869b-0000779fd2ac.html.  We will employ Nordhaus’s substantially more 
conservative figures here; if the IEA is correct, the point is even stronger. 
230 Nordhaus, supra note 229,at 16. 
231 Figure calculated by the authors based upon the projections described in Part III.B.3., 
supra, and the taxation amounts listed in Nordhaus, supra note 229.  That figure would of course 
balloon further in the subsequent decades as Chinese emissions growth, coupled with the rising tax 
rate, far outstrip the rate of inflation.  In addition, a number of other actors, including former Vice 
President Al Gore, the British Stern Report, and the government of Germany, have implicitly 
proposed carbon taxes that would rise to approximately $300 per metric ton within the next two 
decades.  Id.  Nordhaus does not believe that taxes at that level are priced optimally, but it is 
always possible that they will become politically popular, at least in some countries. 
232 It is of course possible that China does not deserve to expand economically in the 
fashion it intends—in the sense that it has a moral obligation to act otherwise—or that the United 
States would be better off it did not simply acquiesce to China’s intentions but instead opposed 
them.  We are not interested in either of these possibilities.  We deal only in the realm of the 
actual, and we do not see any means by which the United States could prevent China from 
industrializing the West short of a major war, an option that of course we view as unacceptable. 
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IV. A WAY FORWARD? 
This paper began by adopting the near-consensus view among 
economists, climatologists, and legal scholars that an agreement to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions is in the best interest of the world as a whole.  
Moreover, there is widespread consensus that such an agreement, if it is to be 
successful, must include China and the rest of the developing world in addition 
to the United States and Europe.233  A treaty regime akin to the Kyoto 
Protocol, which imposed no curbs upon China, the world’s leading polluter, 
will be largely ineffectual in combating global warming.234  Nothing that we 
have found, and nothing that we have argued here, has altered our view on that 
point.  It is worth exploring, then, whether the potential for reaching 
agreement with China remains, and what structure such an agreement (if any) 
might take.  We thus return to the issue we raised obliquely in Part I.C., supra.  
In the sections that follow, we consider several shapes that a global climate 
accord might assume.  We conclude that several of them are non-starters but 
that others offer potential advantages in the search for a workable agreement. 
A.   Status Quo: A Climate Accord Without Side Payments 
Much of the current debate over the framework for a potential climate 
accord has centered on  whether the United States, the European Union, or 
other nations will be forced to compensate China for its participation in an 
agreement to curb greenhouse gases.  A number of scholars have already 
concluded that these types of side payments are both necessary and 
appropriate, and we agree entirely with their conclusions.  However, we intend 
to revisit this issue briefly here in order to illustrate one additional hurdle that 
any agreement without side payments to China is likely to encounter. 
One potential treaty framework—and the one that most closely resembles 
Europe and the United States’ current bargaining positions—is an agreement 
that awards benefits and burdens essentially according to the status quo ante as 
it exists at the time the treaty is made.  Such an arrangement would be possible 
under either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade regime.235  As a carbon tax, it 
                                                 
233 See Sunstein, supra note 1 (explaining the necessity that all major industrialized nations 
participate in a climate regime if it is to be successful). 
234 Id. 
235 A carbon tax, as we mentioned above, is simply a tax imposed on every polluter based 
on the amount of atmospheric carbon that polluter emits.  Under a cap-and-trade regime, nations 
would agree upon the total amount of worldwide emissions they were willing to tolerate (the cap) 
and allocate rights to emit (up to that cap) among themselves.  Countries (or the companies to 
whom they had given the pollution rights) could then buy or sell those emissions rights on an open 
market, allowing the pollution rights to end up in the hands of the highest-value users.  See Robert 
N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 35–55 (Paul R. Portnoy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2000); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2297–99 (2002) (describing the putative advantages of a 
cap-and-trade system). 
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would simply involve a global tax imposed equally upon every country in the 
world, with no special dispensations or variable rates.  In a status quo-
normalized cap-and-trade regime, pollution rights would be distributed 
proportionately to each country’s current emissions levels.  This would 
effectively benchmark pollution rights according to the status quo and force 
countries to buy credits—or allow them to sell—based on the extent to which 
they deviated from their pre-treaty behavior. 
As a number of scholars have pointed out, China will never agree to such 
an arrangement (and indeed, China has expressed similar sentiments 
publicly).236  The reasons for this intransigence are well-established, and we 
will canvas them only very briefly: 
Per-capita entitlements.  First, China has quite strenuously asserted that 
each person on earth—not each country—is entitled to an equal share of 
prosperity (and by extension an equal share of energy production and carbon 
emissions).  Accordingly, China maintains that only per-capita allotments of 
pollution entitlements are normatively acceptable.237  Despite the shortcomings 
of this argument,238 it carries substantial moral force when offered in 
contravention to an arrangement that would merely perpetuate the status quo.  
Contributions to existing stock.  In concert with its argument for per-
capita pollution rights, China notes that the United States and Western Europe 
are responsible for the vast majority of existing human-produced atmospheric 
carbon, carbon that has already produced warming effects.239  To preserve the 
status quo, notes China, would be simply to enshrine the disproportionate 
share of pollution rights that those nations have already seized and the damage 
they have already done (to the detriment of the developing world).240 
Self-interested cost-benefit analysis.  Finally, a number of scholars, most 
notably Cass Sunstein, have argued that the preceding two arguments are 
merely stalking-horses for the fundamental calculus underlying China’s stance 
                                                 
236China unveils climate change plan,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6717671.stm. 
237China urges rich nations to lead on climate  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/34ef96a2-1258-
11dc-a475-000b5df10621.html?nclick_check=1. 
238 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits be Allocated on a 
Per Capita Basis?, available at http://www.ssrn.com (2008). 
239 KEITH BAUMERT, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS 32 (2005) (providing data on 
contributions to historic stocks); Sunstein, Complex Climate Change Incentives, supra note 1, at 
19. 
240 See supra notes 231-32; Daniel A. Farber, Apportioning Climate Change Costs, 26 
U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. 21, 45–46 (2008) (analyzing and describing the objection on 
equitable grounds to apportioning costs based on current emissions); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting 
to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 32 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 1, 32 (2007) (suggesting that 
nations should be held responsible for climate change based on contributions to existing 
atmospheric carbon). 
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on climate change: under a status quo-based climate regime, China would 
almost certainly have to pay more in compliance costs (either in carbon taxes 
or by purchasing additional pollution credits) than it would benefit from 
avoiding warming.241  The analysis we presented above suggests that this 
problem is even worse than previously believed; compliance might cost China 
approximately $76 billion more than current estimates predict.242 
To these three reasons—which are likely dispositive on their own—we 
add a fourth.  Suppose (perhaps counterfactually) that China would benefit in 
the net from even a status quo-based climate accord—that the threat to China 
from warming exceeded the cost of compliance.243  The foregoing arguments 
about per-capita rights and historic emissions notwithstanding, China might be 
persuaded to join a climate treaty that served its own self-interest.  However, 
the benefits and burdens of such a treaty would not be distributed evenly: 
Eastern China has the greater share of low-lying land that would be threatened 
by rising sea levels induced by warming244 and would realize the lion’s share 
of the benefits; Western China will likely rely more heavily on carbon-
intensive industrialization and electrification for future development and 
would bear a disproportionate share of the costs.  Moreover, the CCP cannot 
easily redistribute the benefits of a climate accord from East to West.  We 
noted above the CCP’s ongoing difficulties in maintaining taxation and other 
authority over the provinces.245  These problems are aggravated in the context 
of a climate treaty because the benefits of such a treaty—lives not lost, 
diseases not spread, and land not destroyed—are difficult to monetize and 
redistribute. 
As we have argued ad nauseum, continued western development is a 
political imperative for the CCP.246  Consequently, the CCP might well reject 
even an agreement that benefited China in the net, for fear that it would harm 
its own political position.  Again, as Sunstein and others have noted, China 
certainly will not agree to a climate treaty that does not result in net gains to 
                                                 
241 Sunstein, Complex Climate Change Incentives, supra note 1 (noting the cost-benefit 
calculations of major emitting nations). 
242 See supra Part III.D. (calculating the cost of higher Chinese emissions for a climate 
agreement). 
243 It is conceivable that this is the case, given the uncertainty that surrounds even the best 
economic models of climate change.  See Daniel Farber, Modeling Climate Change.  China could 
be a great deal more at risk from warming than conventional models recognize, or the 
technological response to emissions curbs could be swifter and less expensive than anyone has 
predicted. 
244 E.g., IEA, supra note 178, at 371 (“Over 18 000 km of coastline and more than 5000 
islands are at risk in the event of a rise in sea level.”).  
245 See supra Part II.A.2.  
246 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2008                     Preliminary Draft – Please Do Not Cite Without Permission 55 
 
national welfare.  Our analysis, then, suggests a second precondition: the CCP 
must be capable of distributing the benefits of the agreement such that no 
region of the country—particularly the West—is made worse off.  (We call 
this the “internal pareto” condition.)  We consider two frameworks that satisfy 
this condition below.  
B.  Side Payments 
In the face of Chinese disinterest in participating in a global climate 
regime, the only workable solution might be to compensate China for joining 
such an agreement through a series of side payments.247  Under a carbon tax, if 
China stood to lose more than it gained the United States and Western Europe 
could make up the shortfall through direct payments that would allow China to 
“break even” (at worst) on its participation in the tax.248  Under a cap-and-
trade regime, China could simply be afforded enough valuable pollution 
credits to cover its losses from joining the global cap.  (China could either use 
the credits to avoid some of the costs of reducing carbon emissions or sell 
them on the open market.) 
Under these proposals China would be certain to benefit in the net, but it 
is unclear whether China’s internal pareto condition would be satisfied.  
Imagine a climate agreement that imposed $200 billion in economic costs 
upon China but conferred $100 billion in benefits from environmental damage 
avoided and included a $100 billion side payment from the United States.  If 
the economic cost were unevenly distributed—for instance, $140 billion to 
Western China, and $60 billion to Eastern China—and the environmental 
benefits fell disproportionately upon the East—$80 billion of the total $100 
billion, for instance—Western China would be left with a $120 billion 
“shortfall” that the American side payment would not fully cover.  The CCP 
could endeavor to redistribute tax revenues to cover Western China’s deficit 
(and such a solution might very well be possible) but this is hardly a facile 
measure for a nation with a disproportionately high percentage of sub-national 
expenditures and, consequently, a low rate of federal spending.  The fictional 
$20 billion deficit in this example exceeds the central government’s spending 
on the Western Development Program.249 
                                                 
247 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 3-4; Stewart & Wiener, supra note 1, at 15 (suggesting that 
China be “paid to play”). 
248 The United States itself may not have an enormous amount to lose from global warming, 
at least according to some projections.  By one estimate, 2.5 degree warming will only cause 
damage to the United States equal to 0.45% of GDP (as compared with damage to China of 0.22% 
of GDP).  Boyer & Nordhaus, Warming the World.  Among the world’s wealthy nations, the true 
losers from global warming will be the countries of OECD Europe, who face damages equal to 
2.83% of GDP.  Id.  Thus, as a practical matter, it might be that Europe, not the United States, will 
be compelled to take the lead in compensating China. 
249 See notes 60 & 96, supra, and accompany text. 
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In such a situation it might well be in the interest of the people (and 
government) of Eastern China to buy Western China’s participation through 
intra-national side payments.  Yet it is hard to imagine such an agreement 
becoming feasible.  Even if the provinces of Eastern China agree to subsidize 
Western China pursuant to an international climate treaty, there will be 
nothing to stop Eastern China from reneging on its agreement and free-riding 
off of the CCP’s national enforcement power once the treaty has been signed.  
The CCP’s ability to hold Eastern China to its bargain is no greater or lesser 
than its ability to simply collect the necessary revenues from Eastern China in 
the first place, which (as note above) is limited.  Eastern China’s promise is 
independently worth extremely little.  
The larger problem with arrangements involving international side 
payments is that it may not be politically palatable for those countries asked to 
foot the bill, particularly the United States.  Some in the United States have 
come to view China as its main strategic rival,250 a competitor for economic 
prominence, military might, and even the world’s remaining oil supplies.251  
The United States is already running a tremendous trade deficit with China, 
sending billions of dollars to China on a yearly basis.252  China’s refusal to let 
its currency rise against the dollar—holding down the price of Chinese imports 
and perpetuating the wide trade gap—has caused serious consternation among 
American policymakers.253  At the same time, China has now passed the 
United States as the world’s leading carbon emitter, and American politicians 
will likely view the notion that the United States should offer concessions to 
China to curb its environmentally destructive behavior with the same 
incredulity that Chinese politicians expressed towards the idea that China 
should curb its emissions as a remedy for the damage caused by more than a 
century of American industrialization.254  Any solution that involves United 
                                                 
250 See Mearsheimer, supra note 5; ROBERT G. SUTTER,  CHINA’S RISE IN ASIA: PROMISES 
AND PERIL (2005); For a discussion of policy options to moderate the effect of China’s rise on 
United States interests see NINA HACHIGAN AND MONA SUTPHEN, THE NEXT AMERICAN 
CENTURY: HOW THE US CAN THRIVE AS OTHER POWERS RISE (2008): David M. Lampton, 
China’s Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America’s Expense, in POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA’S 
NEW DYNAMICS (ed. DAVID SHAMBAUGH 2005). 
251 David Zweig & Bi Jianhai, China’s Global Hunt for Energy, 84 FOREIGN AFF. ___ 
(2005).  
252 In 2007, the U.S. trade deficit with China exceeded $256 billion.  U.S. Census Bureau, 
Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) With China, available at 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2008. 
253Stabenow, Bunning, Bayh Introduce Legislation Geared Toward Ending Currency 
Manipulation by China,  http://stabenow.senate.gov/press/2008/040308Currency.htm.  
254 See Kishore Mahbubani, The Case Against the West, 87 FOREIGN AFF., 111, 120 (2008) 
(“Since 1850, China has contributed less than 8 percent of the world’s total emissions of carbon 
dioxide, whereas the United States is responsible for 29 percent and western Europe is responsible 
for 27 percent.”). 
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States further compromising what it already views as an imbalanced 
relationship with China may simply be politically unworkable.255  
What is worse, to the extent that this option was ever politically feasible, 
the updated emissions projections we present here make it substantially less 
so.  Again, by these estimations, between 2005 and 2010 China will emit 2.6 
billion tons of carbon more than the standard models have predicted.256  Under 
one leading carbon tax scenario, this will amount to an additional $76 billion 
emissions tax during that six-year period.257  This is hardly an insignificant 
amount of money, particularly if the United States is being asked to foot the 
bill.  The political future of anti-warming measures is, of course, highly 
uncertain, and the United States may yet come to a point at which it is willing 
to make significant side payments to even a strategic rival such as China in 
order to facilitate a global agreement.258  Nonetheless, it would hard to 
imagine such a political climate arising within the foreseeable future, and the 
possibility that a global climate accord will be founded upon side payments 
from the United States to China strikes us as remote. 
C.  A Modest Proposal: Technology Transfers 
The previous sections have expressed some pessimism about the 
prospects for a workable, effective climate agreement that includes China and 
the United States.  We nevertheless continue to believe that an agreement is 
possible, though a full explication of the contours for a workable climate 
                                                 
255 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 135 (suggesting that the large carbon emitting nations may 
not be able to reach agreement on global warming). 
256 See supra Part III.B. 
257 See Nordhaus, supra note 1, at 45 (suggesting one carbon taxation framework); see also 
supra Part III.D.  Again, these are conservative estimates that may be substantially understated.  
See supra note 229 (describing calls for carbon taxes far in excess of what Nordhaus has 
recommended). 
258 Certainly it would not be absurd to suggest that domestic pressure for the United States 
to negotiate a workable global climate agreement will grow over the coming decades.  One 
indication of this trend is that as of June 2008, the presumptive presidential nominees of both 
political parties have publicly supported a global climate agreement.  See Barack Obama for 
America, available at http://www.barackobama.com/issues/energy/ (“Obama supports 
implementation of a market-based cap-and-trade system to reduce carbon emissions by the amount 
scientists say is necessary: 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.”); Elizabeth Bumiller & John 
M. Broder, McCain Differs With Bush on Climate Change, N.Y. Times, May 13, 2008, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/us/politics/12cnd-mccain.html (describing Senator 
McCain’s call “for a mandatory limit on greenhouse gas emissions in the United States” and his 
support of a global cap-and-trade regime that would include China and India).  However, the same 
rising global levels of fossil fuel consumption that are driving Americans’ concern with global 
warming will also likely drive American antipathy towards China as the two nations compete for 
resources.  The process of national “belt-tightening” that will accompany higher fuel prices and 
precede any meaningful American move towards alternative sources of energy or an international 
climate accord will not tend to favorably dispose the American public towards sending even 
greater capital overseas. 
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agreement is well beyond the scope of this article.  We propose here to sketch 
the rough outlines of an agreement that might be more amenable to all parties. 
 As we note above, there is reason to believe that any monetary side 
payment large enough to induce Chinese participation in an emissions control 
regime will be unacceptable to American politicians and the American 
public.259  Rather than direct monetary payments, the United States (and 
Europe) should perhaps consider negotiating a massive technology transfer to 
China as part of a global climate accord.260  The transfer could assume the 
form of a direct provision of valuable energy-related equipment (which the 
United States would first purchase from American companies), or an 
assignment of “technology credits” (funded by federal dollars) that China 
could use to purchase American energy technology—wind turbines, efficient 
nuclear plants, smokestack scrubbers, solar panels, fuel-efficient engines, and 
the like.  Such a regime would have a number of advantages over a pure cash 
exchange. 
First, it would directly target the costs to China from curbing emissions 
by reducing the price of substituting to cleaner technologies.  From the 
Chinese perspective, a transfer of efficient energy technologies is equivalent to 
cash and would satisfy China’s internal pareto condition.  Second, the United 
States and Europe could be certain that China would use the “side payments” 
appropriately—they would not have to be concerned with the threat that direct 
foreign aid would wind up in the hands of the Chinese military or some other 
politically unacceptable arm of the government.  Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, such an arrangement could be sold politically in the United States 
and Europe as a boon to domestic firms.  The funds sent to China would be 
plunged immediately back into American or European industry, a move that 
would (among other things) afford those firms a competitive advantage in the 
lucrative market for environmental goods. 
Technology transfers in lieu of direct cash payments would hardly 
overcome all of the problems confronting a global climate accord.  It is 
nevertheless possible that an agreement structured around massive technology 
transfers will be both equally attractive to China and more politically palatable 
to the United States and Europe than the alternative.  In light of the hurdles 
                                                 
259 See notes 256–258, supra, and accompany text (describing bilateral Chinese-American 
relations). 
260  This idea may be slowly gaining currency among some developing nations.  At the G-8 
summit, India—the world’s fourth largest emitter of carbon dioxide—requested “aid and 
technology from industrialized countries to help it cut emissions.”  Michael Abramowitz & Blaine 
Harden, Bush Makes Final Push for Global Climate Deal, WASH. POST., July 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/02/AR2008070201148.html.  
For a similar suggestion along these same lines, see Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Policy, 
Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change (unpublished 
manuscript 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159217, at 19–29. 
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those nations will face in reaching agreement on greenhouse emissions, such 
advantages should not be lightly eschewed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
If a global agreement to control greenhouse gas emissions is to succeed, 
China—now the world’s leading polluter—must participate.  Yet there are a 
number of hurdles particular to China’s domestic political dynamics that will 
likely complicate such an agreement.  Rampant Chinese growth over the past 
several decades has led to the creation of what are effectively two nations: 
wealthier, more industrialized Eastern China, and poorer, more agrarian 
Western China.  The result, from the perspective of the world community, is a 
Two Chinas Problem—the existence of these very different “nations” side-by-
side within one political unit threatens to diminish China’s interest in limiting 
greenhouse gases, and inhibit its capability even to do so.  The social and 
economic disparities between East and West have made rapid western growth 
a political imperative for the Chinese Communist Party, and it will be loath to 
sign any agreement that might inhibit that growth.  China has also divested 
substantial authority to the provinces and is burdened by an inefficient 
regulatory structure that, at present, leaves the central administration with 
power to impose environmental limitations on the provinces than most would 
assume.  And the economic heterogeneity within China—in particular, the 
rising industrialization in the West, by comparison to the East’s imminent 
transition to a post-industrial economy—may mask what will be substantial 
increases in Chinese carbon outputs over the coming years, increases that 
economic projections employing only national-level data have not succeeded 
in capturing.  Forging an effective climate agreement that included China was 
certain to be difficult; forging an effective agreement with the Two Chinas 
offers an even greater challenge. 
